‘tear to pieces’ Muhammad Ali – it was quickly clarified that he meant his
arguments, not his person.^2
Invitations to Bandung were sent out selectively and diplomatically.
The USSR had hinted that they wanted their Central Asian republics to
be invited, but Nehru had decided that the USSR should be taken as
a whole and counted as a European country. Only four ‘African’ countries
- Ethiopia, the Gold Coast, Liberia and Sudan – were invited; Libya
and Egypt were considered ‘Arab’ (Bandung was to be Colonel Nasser’s
first international conference). Israel was not invited so as to avoid
offending Arab states – India had recognised Israel, but Nehru had proved
adept at postponing the exchange of diplomatic personnel. Everyone
agreed that China should be invited because of her importance in Asia –
and even to Asian anti-communists, ‘international communism’ meant
the USSR, possibly demonstrating an implicit Eurocentrism. As a result,
Bandung provided the People’s Republic of China with its first inter-
national forum and consequently the first large-scale endorsement of its
legitimate statehood and its place in international politics. This was
largely Nehru’s achievement; his had been the most influential voice
arguing for a recognition of and normal diplomatic relations with the
People’s Republic since the early years of its establishment. Outer
Mongolia, North and South Korea were not invited; nor, because it was
based on the continuing claim to being China, was Taiwan. For this last
discourtesy, an airplane that was carrying an advance Chinese delegation
from Hong Kong to Bandung was blown up by Taiwanese saboteurs;
Zhou Enlai was unfortunately for them not on that plane. The conference
also only invited independent countries (or almost-independent countries,
in the case of the Gold Coast, an invitation which provoked immediate
British protests) – representatives of the Mau Mau in Kenya or the
Malayan Communist Party were therefore excluded from a conference that
was intending centrally to discuss anti-colonialism.
The ‘Bandung Spirit’, referred to later with satisfaction, sought to
present a picture of great solidarity and collective good spirits. The actual
diplomacy was less clear. Holding the Bandung Conference implied
criticism of the United Nations’ handling of anti-colonial questions – that
at least, was UN sources’ view of the conference, although of course this
was nowhere stated. More to the point: the Cold War had reduced the UN
to stalemate. It was to create a similar stalemate at Bandung. The central
issue turned out to be non-alignment versus non-non-alignment. This
HIGH NEHRUVIANISM AND ITS DECLINE, c. 1955–63 217