World politics, however, refused to stay calm to allow Nehru to take
full advantage of the situation. In 1956, the twin crises of Suez and
Hungary were cause for concern. Suez could be interpreted as a culmi-
nation of Nehru’s prophecy of the dangers of dividing the world in terms
of military pacts. Colonel Nasser had seen the Baghdad Pact, signed on
February 24, 1955, as potentially hostile to Egypt; consequently, he
bought arms from the USSR. The Americans responded by withdrawing
US aid for the Aswan High Dam. Nasser responded by the nationalisation
of the Suez Canal. In the crisis that followed, Nehru and Krishna Menon
went about their now familiar task as mediators, Nehru appealing for calm
but making it clear that he would not take a stand against Egyptian
sovereignty. Nehru at first advised Nasser not to place the problem
before the United Nations if he expected support – he had seen too much
horse-trading there to feel this was a safe route. He sought to push for a
compromise – other users of the Canal would be represented as a minority
on the Egyptian corporation for the Canal. This proposal died a natural
death, and Egypt was not particularly enamoured of it in any case. Nehru
then advised going to the Security Council, if only to defer potential
violence. Krishna Menon and Nehru continued to try and play an inter-
mediary role until the Israeli invasion of Egypt in October 1956 and the
British and French ultimatum to Nasser – at which point Nehru spoke
openly of ‘clear aggression and a violation of the United Nations Charter’,
and of the spectre of a revived wave of imperialism.^5
The Suez Crisis raised strong passions in India, and temporarily rallied
divergent elements in domestic politics around Nehru. India threatened
to withdraw from the Commonwealth in protest – this was not just
Nehru’s threat, but was backed by conservatives in India such as
Rajagopalachari; the spectre of a revival of colonialism certainly brought
back the unity around anti-colonialism that had been the hallmark of
the Indian nationalist struggle. At the time, the Soviet Union, Egypt and
China called for a reassembling of the Bandung countries to discuss the
situation, but Nehru rejected this as impractical – he probably had a more
realistic assessment of what the ‘Bandung spirit’ really meant, despite the
rhetoric. Britain and France eventually backed down in the face of its ally,
the USA, refusing to underwrite this adventure.
When the USSR invaded Hungary, however, the principled denunci-
ation everyone expected from Nehru was some time in coming. India
abstained in the UN from voting to ask the USSR to withdraw troops and222 HIGH NEHRUVIANISM AND ITS DECLINE, c. 1955–63