- where the communist tactic of ‘capturing’ party units in the 1930s had
been so successful that the Congress in effect was the CSP, which in turn
was the CPI. The communists’ successes had been based on a significant
commitment to social justice in everyday situations, protecting lower
castes against the more explicit forms of discrimination, and coordinating
resistance to oppressive landlords. All of this was, it might have been
remarked, well within the ‘Nehruvian’ project, and within the parameters
envisaged by the Indian Constitution; indeed, it might be said that
the CPI’s successes were built on implementing Nehru’s comparatively
moderate social goals – because they were not constrained, as he was,
to operate within a centre-right party with a commitment to the status
quo.
Sources within the Congress, assessing the electoral showing, showed
dissatisfaction at these results. The lesson they drew was that the Congress
could no longer rely on rhetoric alone and would have to deliver on some
of its promises in a more concrete manner. The Gandhian, Shriman
Narayan, pointed out that ‘conflict of class interest’ had to be acknowl-
edged by the Congress, that the interests of the poor and of the ‘privileged
and richer sections’ of society could not indefinitely be harmonised, and
that ‘socialism’, albeit ‘through persuasion and democratic legislation’,
had to be made a priority.^8 Internal voices, seeking to justify their actions
through statements made by Nehru at various points, organised a
Congress Socialist Forum within the party – providing a fleeting sense of
déjà vu, perhaps – but Nehru was most discouraging.
Nehru’s campaign speeches against the CPI in the 1957 elections
had hinged on the fact that they were obsolete and thought in categories
that no longer applied to the world and to India. This criticism was
somewhat inaccurate and itself obsolete: the positions he attacked were,
if they had ever been held in the forms described, no longer held. In any
case, the communists in India, contrary to the propaganda surrounding
their status as agents of a foreign power, had always been quite adept at
interpreting directives from on high – Moscow or, before 1947, the CPGB - in ways that were suitable for what its own leaders believed would be
right for the situation. ‘Official’ policy could thus often be observed in the
breach – the Popular Front line had been interpreted as one against
imperialism rather than fascism because India did not have a particularly
strong fascist movement; the placing of India in the imperialist camp after
1947 had been tempered by the CPI’s effective participation in ‘national’
230 HIGH NEHRUVIANISM AND ITS DECLINE, c. 1955–63