game of chess’.^19 An ill-equipped and poorly-funded army – raising the
military budget was opposed even by those in the Lok Sabha who hysteri-
cally advocated the use of force against China – was courting disaster.
Some of the more adventurous acts of the ‘forward policy’ occurred
without Nehru’s knowledge. It is reasonable to suggest that in the run-up
to the January 1962 general elections, this was considered a popular policy
to follow. From the autumn of 1961, the invasion of Goa was planned. The
timing of the invasion was the subject of some comment: many saw it as
a way for the government to appear decisive when they looked anything
but decisive when faced with China. This was a soft target, and relatively
consensual: Goa’s continuance as a Portuguese colony had long been
considered an anomaly; India had broken off diplomatic ties with Portugal
in 1955 following the firing upon and killing of satyagrahiscampaigning
for Goan independence. The Portuguese were not likely to retaliate, and
the international community would not make too many noises; the
so-called ‘police action’ was carried out in December 1961. Nehru, to give
him credit, had vacillated till the end: ‘he had a complicated temperament;
he didn’t like the vulgarity and the cruelty of it, but at the same time
he wanted results,’ was Krishna Menon’s retrospective view.^20 Nehru
recognised that it would take pressure off him with regard to the China
situation – although it contradicted his policy on peaceful and negotiated
solutions. At any event, Goa, in stirring up national feeling against the
residual coloniser, appears to have been a surrogate for China. But
disturbingly, after Goa more far-fetched and explicitly threatening
remarks were directed towards China – even by Nehru. In the election
campaigns, home minister Lal Bahadur Shastri threatened China with a
similar fate to that of Goa, and the Congress president, Sanjiva Reddy,
talked about forcing Pakistan out of Kashmir. The restraint shown by
China on the border was interpreted as a sign of weakness.
The January 1962 elections, predictably, kept the Congress in power:
it won 358 of 491 seats in the Lok Sabha, 72.9%, with 44.78% of the
vote share, and managed to hold on to the states. But the results did
not strengthen Nehru’s hand. The right showed impressive gains: 18 seats
and 7.89% of the vote to the Swatantra Party, 14 seats to the Jan Sangh,
with 6.43% of the vote. The Praja Socialist Party won 12 seats, with
6.81% of the vote share, and Lohia’s Socialist Party six seats, with 2.83%
of the vote share. With the secular and communal right having worked
together throughout the previous parliamentary session, and the position
HIGH NEHRUVIANISM AND ITS DECLINE, c. 1955–63 245