of the PSP, working closely with Masani through the Congress for
Cultural Freedom, remaining ambiguous, this was a disturbing trend for
Nehru, especially when the Congress right’s hostility to him was taken
into consideration. Meanwhile, the CPI increased its seats from 27 to 29,
5.9% of the seats, raising its vote share to 9.94%.^21
The China crisis continued. There were still occasional glimpses
that Nehru was not unable to be sensible – in May 1962, he told the Lok
Sabha, ‘If you start thinking as the Chinese do... on the assumption that
the territory in Ladakh, especially in the Aksai Chin area, is theirs and has
been theirs, well, everything we do is an offence to them. But if we start
on the basis of thinking that the territory is ours, as it is, then everything
the Chinese do is an offence. It depends on with what assumption you
have started.’^22 The almost throwaway line ‘as it is’, indicated that Nehru
could not afford to be seen to be making concessions – the opposition, as
it was, refused even to see talks with a Chinese delegation as anything
short of surrender to an aggressor. Yet things were now beginning to look
dangerous. In July 1962, the USSR asked the two sides to negotiate; China
promptly agreed, but the Indian opposition would not agree to any
softening of India’s stand: the boundaries were not negotiable.
It was surprising that open armed conflict took so long to begin. On
September 9, 1962, the decision to evict Chinese troops from south of the
McMahon Line was taken – although there had long been Indians north
of the line, in territory even the extreme Indian position did not claim.
This decision was taken by Krishna Menon in Nehru’s absence in London
at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers’ conference. Military officers knew
this was disastrous and delayed action as long as they could – they knew
their troops would be slaughtered. Still the hope remained that the
Chinese would not retaliate – but on October 10, their first retaliation
alarmed the generals in command. On October 13, Nehru responded
to reporters’ questions: ‘our instructions are to free our territory’ – this
was interpreted worldwide as his declaration of war. On October 20, the
Chinese assault began – it was swiftly clear that they could go anywhere
they wished across any lines they cared to cross.
As the military defeats built up, Krishna Menon swiftly became the
scapegoat; by November 8 he had been dropped from the Cabinet after
pressure led by the president of India, Dr Radhakrishnan. Nehru had tried
to avoid sacrificing Menon by first effectively demoting him and then
by offering to resign himself – this tactic had always worked in the246 HIGH NEHRUVIANISM AND ITS DECLINE, c. 1955–63