The Changing Nature of Military Alliances
and the resolution of conflict. The major states chose the latter
and established a system that not only created the structure of
the congress system but also included detailed provisions for
the division of territory following the war. Even defeated France
was admitted to the alliance within four years—once it had
reestablished the monarchy and had agreed to its new borders.
Alliances that resolve territorial issues can generally be
identified by whether signatories have either (1) exchanged
territory by treaty or (2) agreed by treaty to a de facto settle-
ment of territory as it existed at the time of the alliance.
Exchange settlements must contain explicit terms for the
transfer of territory from one alliance member to another;
exchanges that occur outside the treaty text are not considered.
De facto settlements represent the formal acceptance by treaty
members of the current distribution of territorial control in a
treaty-specified region.
Many of the territorial settlements involved an actual
exchange of territory, as in the 1925 transfer of Fiume from
Yugoslavia to Italy. However, a significant number involved de
facto settlements; the post–Napoleonic Wars alliance making is
a good example of this type. A more recent example would be
the agreement reached by India and Bangladesh in 1972. Not
included as alliances settling territorial divisions are those
alliances that guarantee a future distribution of territory. Obvi-
ously, these alliances are provocative in nature because they
redraw the regional map surrounding the states in the alliance.
Territorial settlement treaties are surprisingly peaceful. The
summaries in this volume often describe the conflicts that led
to alliance formation and the conflicts that alliances created.
Territorial settlements, however, almost always describe coop-
eration among allied members for the settlement of dangerous
issues. Beyond anecdotal data are empirical studies that con-
firm the relationship between territorial settlement treaties and
peace. One recent study (Gibler 1996) showed that only one of
twenty-seven territorial settlement treaties in the past two cen-
turies was followed by war within five years (compared with a
likelihood of war of more than 30 percent for members of
alliances in general).
Unlike other types of alliances—alliances that focus on
manipulations of power—the anticipated reactions to the terri-
torial settlement treaties include decreased armament levels,
decreased membership in other alliances, and decreased
involvement in crises. The territorial settlements send a signal
that the member states are attempting to resolve their conflicts
through peaceful measures. Thus, there is no need for aggressive
bargaining and military adventuring. Instead, peace in the
region becomes much more likely.
Even those alliances that do not begin as territorial settle-
ment treaties can evolve into territorial management alliances
over time. Leaders must pay a range of transaction costs in
order to form an alliance. These costs may include such simple
items as the transportation costs and the amount of time
expended in order to negotiate a treaty. For leaders 200 years
ago, these costs were sometimes substantial. In the modern era,
however, the real transaction costs of alliance formation often
involve changes in public opinion in democracies and the
expenditure of domestic political power to get an agreement
negotiated and signed. If leaders want to signal their commit-
ment to the new agreement, they often must move troops, begin
building organizational offices, and otherwise make known to
other leaders that the new alliance represents a credible com-
mitment to aid the other alliance partner. Thus, alliance making
can sometimes become a costly endeavor.
Fortunately for leaders, most of these transaction costs are
spent only once, when an alliance treaty is newly signed. The
nature of these costs creates incentives for leaders in an alliance
to use the existing structure of cooperation to perform new
tasks. Because the transaction costs had already been paid to
form an alliance, it would make little sense to recreate an
alliance in order to serve a different need. These incentives make
it likely that some of the longest-lasting alliances are really
treaties of alliance cooperation that have evolved over time.Today’s Defensive Alliances Finding New Goals
Consider the changes that have taken place within the OAS,
NATO, and the WEU. All three alliances trace their beginnings
to the start of the cold war between the United States and the
Soviet Union, which is why each treaty carried specific provi-
sions for collective self-defense.
For the OAS, Article 28 of the Charter states:
Every act of aggression by a State against the territorial
integrity or the inviolability of the territory or against the
sovereignty or political independence of an American
State shall be considered an act of aggression against the
other American States.
Article 5 of the NATO Charter:
The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or
more of them in Europe or North America shall be con-
sidered an attack against them all.
And, finally, Article 4 of the WEU:
If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the
object of an armed attack in Europe, the other High Con-
tracting Parties will, in accordance with the provisions of
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, afford the
Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assis-
tance in their power.
These strong collective self-defense provisions embodied the
core goals of those who signed the original alliances. Western
leaders were concerned about the Soviet threat and wanted to
provide some type of collective defense against the spread of
communism in Western Europe and Latin America.
Each of the three treaties also encouraged cooperation in
other issue areas. Returning again to the theme of borders and
territorial issues, each alliance treaty included specific provi-
sions for the maintenance of the territorial status quo and for
judicial settlements of any disputes involving territorial issues.