240 Chapter 3
captain of that ship was found guilty of human trafficking. The French informed the
British, now monitoring the issue, that they interpreted this case as a very grave affair.
Count Walewski, French foreign minister, informed Portugal that France did not inter-
pret the capture as legal. Portugal replied that the case had been submitted to a com-
mission for examination by the governor-general of Mozambique. On August 13, the
condemned Charles et George arrived in Lisbon with a Portuguese crew, brandishing
a Portuguese flag. Meanwhile, tensions grew between France and Portugal.
Count Walewski replied to the Portuguese that the ship left Reunion before it knew
that Portugal prohibited exporting “negroes” from its ports. In a later note, the British
informed the French that they found this to be a convoluted justification since France
willingly signed an antislave trading agreement, to which Portugal was also party.
French justification continued. With that misinterpretation already established by
Walewski, he proceeded to add that most of the “negroes” were from French territory
and were “purchased” for what he insisted were legal purposes. They were purchased
from an Arab sheik, a Portuguese authority, for a designated period of time (five
years) after which they were free to return home or stay in France. With this in mind,
Count Walewski, by August 16, 1858 (the date when the British found out about this),
demanded the immediate release of the ship, the imprisoned captain, and the appropri-
ate indemnity for the 110 “negroes” who were not able to reach France. On September
18, 1858, France reiterated its demand for the immediate release of the ship and the
captain, given as a Captain Rouxel. It added to its interpretation of the events, noting
that since a government official (for the Island of Reunion) was on board, there was no
way the ship could possibly engage in slave trading since France knew its obligations
to ending slave trading. France informed Portugal that determining the culpability of
everyone involved would be a responsibility for France and France alone. Portugal
replied to this most recent demand by noting that the French interpretation of the
event is inconsistent with what was already determined in Mozambique. They were
not “free laborers,” but slaves purchased by the ship’s captain. On October 2, France
again demanded the immediate release of the ship. The next day, two French vessels
arrived at the Tagus to support and enforce French demands. More were likely coming.
Portugal, fearful, asked if submitting the issue to neutral arbitration would be an
acceptable compromise. France refused. Upon hearing this, Britain detached two of its
ships—the Victor Emmanuel and the Racoon—to the area to protect British subjects,
British interests, and to monitor the French vessels. Shortly thereafter, the seeds were
planted to end this dispute. Portugal thought it could count on British moral support
for the actions undertaken off Mozambique as the British had confiscated a French
ship for a similar reason. None was coming. By October 13, the British understood
Portugal was close to capitulation. Two days later, the British informed the French
minister that it protested France’s immediate use of coercion to resolve this crisis,
also adding that its interpretation of the events is largely consistent with how Portugal
relayed it. While they tried to allow Portugal to save face, British support was ulti-
mately withheld. Portugal was unable to withstand the pressure and, on October 23,
ultimately capitulated to Walewski’s demand.
Therein, Portugal recognized that: (1) It would release the ship and captain no later
than 24 hours after the French vessels left the Tagus; (2) Mediation or arbitration on this
matter was rejected by France and would not be required to solve the dispute; (3) Failure
to meet these terms would lead to the severance of relations between the two countries.