The Mercenary Mediterranean_ Sovereignty, Religion, and Violence in the Medieval Crown of Aragon - Hussein Fancy

92 chapter four

Aragonese captain named at Tlemcen, William Gauceran, was forgiven

his participation in rebellion against the king.^123 Kings also granted these

soldiers immunity from any religious crimes that they might incur or

had incurred while aiding non- Christians.^124 This privilege could also be

granted to an entire family line in perpetuity.^125 Honors and privileges

such as these were expressions of the new jurisdictional prerogatives of

the Aragonese kings and mirrored their treatment of jenet elites.

Earlier studies of Christian militias in North Africa have concluded that

these soldiers were consciously transgressing or ignoring religious bound-

aries.^126 These negotiations and privileges from the thirteenth century sug-

gest, in contrast, that religious or, more precisely, pastoral concerns were

of central importance to the soldiers. North African caliphs and sultans

permitted Christian militias to build and maintain churches and to cele-

brate public rituals. Soldiers sought absolutions from the Aragonese kings

for their sins in serving Muslim rulers.

What is more, popes and religious lawyers were both more permissive

of and involved in these activities than one might imagine. It is true that in

1214 , after the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa, Innocent III (r. 1198 – 1216 )

excommunicated all Christians who offered military aid to Muslims.^127

Within the peninsula, the archbishop of Toledo similarly condemned the

mercenaries in North Africa in 1222 or 1223.^128 Nevertheless, as Simon

Barton and Michael Lower have shown, these rigid attitudes masked flex-

ibility.^129 Over the thirteenth century, the papacy eased or added subtlety

to its stance toward Christian militias in North Africa. Fearing that they

would alienate Christians living abroad, some popes began to recognize

the spiritual needs of Christian mercenaries. Honorius III (r. 1216 – 1227 )

absolved these soldiers of their sins and urged the Almohad Caliph to

allow them to practice Christianity freely.^130 For his part, Innocent IV

(r. 1243 – 1254 ) saw the Muslim sultans’ dependence upon these troops as

an asset and used the threat of withdrawing his approval of their resi-

dence in North Africa for diplomatic leverage. By the time of Nicholas IV

(r. 1288 – 1292 ), the pope claimed that the presence of Christian soldiers

might have a positive effect on the conversion of the Muslims.^131 Ramón

de Penyafort (d. 1275 ), the master- general of the Dominican Order and

advisor to Jaume I, clarified that only soldiers who had the king’s permis-

sion to serve in North Africa should be considered licit.^132 For his part,

the bishop of North Africa openly acknowledged the leadership of Ber-

nat Segui in Morocco.^133 Were these venal gestures or attempts to justify

political ends? Just like the Aragonese kings, the Papacy and religious