the terraferma state 97
factions sympathized, respectively, with Venice and the Empire), and
could also detonate rudimentary class conflict, especially peasants’ resent-
ment of their landed betters.
c. Venetian Policy Priorities
An unsurprising priority in attention and direct involvement by Venetian
authority was defense organization. Hitherto used to occasional use of
citizen militiamen and hired professionals when land war required forces
larger than peacetime garrisons, the Republic developed a standing army
which became arguably the strongest in Italy. Whereas Venetians and mar
subjects manned the navy, command and service in this land army was
the preserve of non-Venetian professionals, including an increasing pro-
portion of terraferma subjects, occasionally supported by militia raised
in the provinces. All major policy decisions and appointments, and gen-
eral supervision of the army, were reserved to Venetian authority and
Venetian-named personnel.21
With defense and public debt generated by it swallowing the majority
of state income, equally unsurprising was the Venetian takeover of the
receipt and disbursement of most mainland revenue, especially from indi-
rect taxation, the source of the great majority of tax income.22 In peace-
time in the later 15th century, the mainland’s incomes more than covered
its ordinary costs of government and defense, contributing about 420,000
ducats to the Republic’s total revenue of about 1,150,000 ducats. But the
politically delicate matters of sharing and collection of mainland direct
tax were left to local bodies, which also handled much public spending
and tax-raising extraneous to state finance proper. Connected with public
finance, but important for the economy in general and for the symbol-
ism of dominion, was monetary policy, over which Venice established full
control, though making concessions to local identity, e.g., in minting coins
for Verona with the image of its patron saint, Zeno.23
21 Michael Mallett and John Hale, The Military Organization of a Renaissance State. Ven-
ice c.1400 to 1617 (Cambridge, 1983).
22 Michael Knapton, “Guerra e finanza (1381–1508),” in Cozzi and Knapton, La Repub-
blica di Venezia, vol. 1, pp. 273–348; Luciano Pezzolo, Una finanza d’ancien régime. La
Repubblica veneta tra XV e XVIII secolo (Naples, 2006); Luciano Pezzolo, “Stato, guerra e
finanza nella Repubblica di Venezia fra medioevo e prima età moderna,” in Rossella Can-
cila, ed., Mediterraneo in armi: secc. XV–XVIII (Palermo, 2007) (=Quaderni—Mediterranea.
Ricerche storiche 4 (2007)), pp. 67–112.
23 Reinhold Mueller, “L’imperialismo monetario veneziano nel Quattrocento,” Società
e Storia 8 (1980), 277–97.