the terraferma state 111
potential development of the structure and function of state organization,
in government of both the mainland and the Republic in general. Though
the patriciate assimilated terraferma ethos more deeply in various ways,
especially the social and cultural attitudes and lifestyle of its landowning
nobility, its already strong sense of its own and of Venice’s past glory and
identity gradually gained in introspection. Its political horizons and its
potential for statecraft narrowed, so limiting its capacity to take the initia-
tive in government of the terraferma and to react to demands and stimuli
expressed by mainland society.
Such inhibition was particularly evident in caution over the risks inher-
ent in giving single bodies a dominant role in key sectors of central govern-
ment. Though there was a general de facto drift towards oligarchy, evident
after 1630 especially in the power accumulated by the State Inquisitors
over increasingly broadly defined issues of state security, formal adher-
ence to republican principles required—among other things—the exis-
tence of a plethora of executive magistracies, many with at least partial
terraferma competence, their number a symbol of power and source of
income for patricians but also an obstacle to definition and division of
functions and thus, therefore, to efficiency. More so than before, the juxta-
position of old and new magistracies and overlaps and confusion in their
competence limited potential rationalization.
In marked contrast with the tendency at the center, for magistracies to
expand in numbers and cumulative competence, and also for some revi-
sion of their roles, Venetian mainland governors lost overall importance
in government of the dominion, though their role remained delicate.50
Indeed, proportionally many fewer governors bothered to present final
reports after the 1640s, while the reports produced lost breadth and bite—
trends only partly reversed after the Ottoman wars. This indicated shifts
within patrician career patterns: lesser governorships became more inten-
tionally means of financial support for poor patricians, while major main-
land posts, gradually harder to elect to, entailed considerable personal
financial outlay by their more ambitious and wealthy fellows. In both
cases, their duty easily flattened into largely bureaucratic routine as more
capillary government action by agencies in Venice reduced their scope for
decision-making and mainland subjects’ direct contact with the capital
expanded. Nor did this overall profile of permanent Venetian officials in
the provinces gain from the presence either of occasional inspectors like
50 Knapton, “Dico in scrittura.”