138 benjamin arbel
image of the stato da mar as a chain of ports whose main function was
to serve as infrastructure for Venice’s commercial shipping is incomplete,
but the support and development of maritime trade was a chief factor in
the conduct of Venice’s overseas policies. This was without any doubt one
of the motivations for Venice’s intervention in Cyprus in 1473–74, con-
sidering Cyprus’ role in Venice’s maritime trade in the eastern Mediter-
ranean. Likewise, it must have been a crucial consideration that led to
the conquest of Zante in 1482, in view of Zante’s location at the entry to
(or exit from) the Adriatic Sea. And this must also have been a central
factor in deciding to occupy the Apulian port towns in the 1490s, tak-
ing into account their geopolitical position and their importance for the
grain trade of southern Italy. In all these examples there was a danger
that a rival power (the Kingdom of Naples or France) would gain control
of these important sea lanes.
Strategic considerations also ranked high in the decision whether or
not to occupy a certain territory. For example, the repeated refusals to
accept Cattaro’s submission (before finally approving it in 1420) must have
been related to the evident difficulties in protecting this town, situated
deep inside the long and narrow gulf bearing its name, the entrance of
which was partly controlled by other powers. Indeed, one may wonder
what made Venice decide to buy the town of Scutari, which could not
be reached directly by sea-going vessels. Venetian galleys sent to defend
it in 1474 could sail upstream the Boiana River only up to the Benedic-
tine monastery of St. Sergius and Bacchus, wherefrom it was necessary
to reach Lake Scutari by smaller boats. Despite Scutari’s heroic resistance to
repeated Ottoman attacks, it is no wonder that Venice finally agreed to
surrender it as a price for a peace treaty that concluded its long war with
Mehmed the Conqueror in 1479.26 Venice’s inland Albanian possessions—
Scutari, Drivato, and even Alessio (situated at only 3 km from the sea)—
were, in fact, the first in that area to be relinquished or lost.
The overseas colonies also served as components of Venice’s elaborate
information network, as can be observed by going through the Diaries
of Marin Sanudo.27 There were territories that held no economic impor-
tance (and were, rather, an economic burden) and hardly any military
advantage, but which could serve as excellent posts of observation on the
movement of ships and also on developments on nearby territories. The
26 Schmitt, Das Venezianische Albanien, pp. 25–26, 612–28.
27 Pierre Sardella, Nouvelles et speculations à Venise au début du 16e siècle (Paris, 1948).