venice’s maritime empire in the early modern period 215
they would become a chronic problem for Venice right to the eve of the
Cretan war.345 It would be impossible to follow these developments here
in detail, but it is important to emphasize the complexity of the social,
political, cultural, and even geographic factors that must be considered
in this case. The recurrent unrest was confined to the mountainous areas
of western Crete, particularly to Sfakia, a region known for its hardy and
ungovernable inhabitants and its rough mountains, where, according to
the report of Capitano Generale of Crete, Girolamo Corner, no public mag-
istrate had dared to come for 15 years.346 As it appears from the Venetian
documentation, a great number of the people involved in this turmoil
were outlaws who found refuge in those inaccessible mountains and
lived chiefly on robbery. Thus, a coalition of frustrated and over-exploited
peasants, hundreds of outlaws, and several powerful clan leaders demon-
strated, though at a high price, the limits of Venetian authority in one of
its premier colonial possessions. Significantly, the actual military confron-
tation involved the fighting of Cretan peasants on both sides, and there
were also Cretans who supported the actions of the authorities and even
demanded Venetian intervention against what they described as robbers.347
However, even the very harsh measures taken against the rebels, includ-
ing large-scale executions and banishments, were not very effective.348
But despite the numerous phenomena of misadministration in Crete, and
notwithstanding the animosity to Venice that must have existed at least
in some sectors of Cretan society, it would be difficult to consider these
recurrent phenomena of disobedience and unrest as a Cretan rebellion
aimed at ending Venetian rule.
In dealing with disturbances, a variety of measures were open to the
authorities, and the result often depended on the particular circumstances,
both local and international, and also on the choice of magistrates who
were required to deal with the challenge. A criminal trial was the easiest
way, often without the culprits even present—which explains the great
number of outlaws in Venetian territories and even in the Venetian fleet.
A military expedition had to be approved by the central authorities, nor-
mally the Council of Ten and later the state inquisitors, who specified
the level of action allowed to the commander of the operation. Such
expeditions, especially in the larger colonies, such as Crete and Cyprus,
345 Papadia-Lala, Αροτικές Ταραχές. See also O’Connell, Men of Empire, pp. 149–58.
346 Sanudo, I diarii, 46:425, 427.
347 Spanakis, ed., Μνημία, 4:143 (relazione of Filippo Pasqualigo, 1594).
348 Papadia-Lala, Αροτικές Ταραχές, pp. 156–61.