A Companion to Venetian History, 1400-1797

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218 benjamin arbel


and Churchmen—normally do not figure in the colonial balance sheets.355
Nonetheless, despite these defects, the official balance sheets do provide
information that cannot be found elsewhere; therefore, although we have
to put them in a wider economic context, we cannot ignore them.
A quick look at the extant balance sheets shows that while some colo-
nies appear to have had a nice surplus of revenues over expenditures,
others suffered from chronic deficit. For example, at least until the
appearance of the Ottomans in the western Balkans in the 1470s, Curzola
enjoyed a surplus of revenues over expenses.356 The same applies to the
Cypriot treasury from the mid 1550s onward (even without taking into
account the great revenues from Cypriot salt exported to Venice).357 The
early 18th-century Morea, if the figures cited by Leopold von Ranke are
correct, seems to have been a remunerative colonial enterprise. After the
first 10–15 years of Venetian rule, the territory appears to have been eco-
nomically sustainable, as far as Venice was concerned.358
However, many territories suffered from chronic or temporary deficits,
at least according to the official fiscal reports. The colonial principle of
self-sufficiency was then applied on an imperial scale: richer colonies
were required to cover the deficit of poorer ones. Thus in the early 15th
century, Durazzo and Alessio, and at a later stage Corfu, were called upon
to subsidize Scutari, Dulcigno, and Antivari, though not on a regular basis.
In the Peloponnese, Napoli di Romania was normally required to cover
the deficit of Argos, and in the mid-15th century, Scutari contributed to
cover the deficit of Drivasto, Dagno, and Budua.359 Cerigo suffered from
a chronic deficit, and its budget had to be continuously replenished by
the treasuries of Corfu, Zante, Cephalonia, or Santa Maura.360 From the
16th century onward, however, military expenses were such that regular
subventions from Venice for this purpose could not be avoided.


355 On the defective nature of the colonial balance sheets, see also Andrea Andréades,
“L’administration financière et économique de Venise dans ses possessions du Levant,”
L’Acropole 1 (1926), 18–19.
356 Schmitt, “Korčula,” p. 23.
357 Arbel, “Η Κύπρος,” p. 484.
358 Ranke, “Die Venezianer in Morea,” 2:326–27; see also Manfroni, I colonizzatori
italiani, 2:291.
359 Major, “Un héritage,” p. 281; Schmitt, Das venezianische Albanien, pp. 322–23.
360 Andrea M. Andreadis, Περί της οικονομικής διοικήσεως της Επτανήσου επί βενετοκρατίας,
2 vols (Athens, 1914), 2:252–55; Charalambos Gasparis, “Cerigo sotto il dominio veneto.
Problemi di economia di un’isola di importanza strategica,” in Marina Koumanoudi and
Chryssa Maltezou, eds., Venezia e Cerigo (Venice, 2003), pp. 112, 115. See also Mueller,
“Aspects of Venetian Sovereignty,” pp. 37–38.

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