the venetian economy 261
cost.”10 The component of defense represented a fundamental element in
maritime trade. Thus, uncertainties about the pirates who infested Medi-
terranean waters were added to those of the climate, though the former
were far more worrying. Not by chance, at the beginning of the 14th cen-
tury, the great Venetian galleys counted a minimum of 30 crossbowmen
in a crew of 180 men; and in the 15th century a 250-ton vessel would carry
20 sailors, eight servants, and at least 4 crossbowmen.11
Though it is difficult to quantify the difference between the costs
incurred by the Venetians compared to those of their competitors, it is
plausible to argue that, at least until the 15th century, the former enjoyed
lower costs, allowing them to benefit from a revenue of protection (that is
to say, the differential between the different costs). The 20 per cent differ-
ence in price between the spices the Venetians imported and those sold
by French merchants may rightly be considered as a burden attributable
to higher protection and transaction costs. Considering that insurance
rates for galleys on the Venice–Alexandria route in times of peace did not
exceed 2 per cent,12 and in the 1440s insurance rates on the Flanders route
were in the range of 4 per cent, while Florentines paid 7 per cent for state
ships and 10–12 per cent for private vessels,13 this difference represented
a protection revenue all to the Venetians’ advantage. The benefits that
were ensured to their operators were the result of a long and uncertain
struggle that characterized the projection of Venetian power in the east-
ern Mediterranean.
The Venetian government was the first to maintain a permanent fleet
(from the beginning of the 14th century) whose primary responsibility was
patrolling the Adriatic Sea. Although it was not possible to fully secure
these waters, due to the technological limitations of the era, it is nonethe-
less significant that the Venetian rulers had decided to employ military
10 Frederic C. Lane, “National Wealth and Protection Costs,” in Lane, Venice and History
(Baltimore, 1966), p. 374.
11 Bernard Doumerc, “La difesa dell’impero,” in Gino Benzoni and Antonio Menniti
Ippolito, Storia di Venezia. Dalle origini alla caduta della Serenissima, 14 vols (Rome, 1992–
2002), vol. 3 (1997): La formazione dello stato patrizio, ed. Girolamo Arnaldi, Giorgio Cracco,
and Alberto Tenenti, p. 240; Frederic C. Lane, “The Crossbow in the Nautical Revolution of
the Middle Ages,” in Benjamin G. Kohl, and Reinhold C. Mueller, eds., Studies in Venetian
Social and Economic History (London, 1987), p. 165.
12 Karin Nehlsen von Stryk, Die venetianische Seevericherung im 15. Jahrhundert (Ebel-
sbach, 1986), Appendix.
13 Bernard Doumerc, “Le galere da mercato,” in Storia di Venezia, vol. 12 (1991): Il mare,
ed. Alberto Tenenti and Ugo Tucci, p. 374.