politics and constitution 61
We have ample evidence of this particular intuition/translation on the
terrain of the political and institutional conflicts between the late 15th and
early 16th centuries. We see it, for example, in the 1499 trial conducted
against the capitano generale da mar [commander of the naval fleet],
Antonio Grimani.23 The holder of highest military office in the Venetian
navy was accused of being responsible, because of his pusillanimity, for
the shameful defeat of the Venetians by the Ottomans at Zonchio in the
waters of Lepanto.
For those who charged him—patricians of modest fortune serving
as rectors or ships’ masters in the maritime colonies—Grimani had to
be subjected to the judgment of the Venetian plenary assembly of the
Maggior Consiglio. State treason demanded a trial in which the deciding
court was composed of all the members of the republican body. To justify
such a claim, Grimani’s accusers referred to a law of the late 13th century
that mandated decapitation for captains and fleet commanders found
guilty of the crime of cowardice.
There was thus defined a habitus we might define “veterorepubblicano,”
which sought legitimacy in the history of the ancient constitution; sen-
tences, laws, and customs of the 13th and 14th centuries could serve to
provide stability to a system in crisis for reasons both internal and exter-
nal. This definition of an identity would soon clash with another politi-
cal style, a different way of representing, on the part of individuals and
houses, one’s belonging to the civitas, and distinguished by the attempt
to identify Venice as an “altera Roma” [another Rome].24
This divergent style is well represented by the figure of Doge Andrea
Gritti (1523–38) and his plan for a Renovatio urbis that marked his dogado.
For it was in these years that there clearly emerged the myth of Venice as
a second Rome. From the field of artistic and architectural renewal to that
of political and constitutional transformations, Venetian history seems to
be characterized by a desire to imitate the great classical model. On the
political side we can recognize this propensity for identification with
the institution of the magistracy of the Censori, charged with supervising
the correctness of electoral procedures and punishing cases of corruption
23 Dorit Raines, L’invention du mythe aristocratique. L’image de soi du patriciat vénitien
au temps de la Sérénissime, vol. 1 (Venice, 2006), pp. 295–97; Alfredo Viggiano, “Il processo
al Capitano Generale da Mar Antonio Grimani, ‘Ruina de’ Christiani,’ ‘Rebello de’ Vene-
tiani’ (1499–1500),” in Yves-Marie Bercé, ed., Le procès poltiques (XIVe–XVIIe siècle) (Rome,
2007), pp. 251–72.
24 Manfredo Tafuri, Venezia e il Rinascimento, Religione, Scienza, Architettura (Turin,
1985).