40 Chrissis
the 13th century, Michael of Epirus had made common cause with the prince
of Achaea against Nicaea, while the Genoese had eagerly cooperated with
the “schismatic” Michael viii against their Venetian competitors; likewise,
Byzantine contenders did not hesitate to use Turkish help against each other
in the civil wars that rocked the empire in the 14th century. What was striking
was that this operation took on the mantle of Holy War for the defence of the
faith. The Greeks, erstwhile enemies of the Church, were now included among
its defenders. The text of the treaty of September 1332, after deploring the evils
inflicted by the Turks on Christians, both Greeks and Latins, goes on to state
that the “exalted princes” (the Byzantine emperor, the doge of Venice and the
Hospitaller Grand Master) have agreed to take common action “out of rever-
ence to God, for the exaltation of the orthodox faith and for the consolation of
the aforementioned Christians”.46 As noted, Pope John xxii gave his support
to the league. Yet, only a few years earlier, in a letter to Robert of Naples in late
1328, he had described in very similar terms the sufferings of the faithful in
Romania but had, on that occasion, included the Greeks among the “enemies
of the cross” who were responsible for the situation and against whom the
Christian (i.e. Catholic) powers should ally.47
In September 1334, the forces of the League achieved a notable success by
destroying the fleet of the emir of Karasi at Adramyttion. A number of attacks
were also made on Turkish coasts and ships, including a raid against Smyrna,
held by the emir of Aydin.48 The success proved short-lived, however, as
46 Thomas, Diplomatarium, 1: no. 116.
47 Walter Norden, Das Papsttum und Byzanz (Berlin, 1903), p. 702; Norman Housley, “Angevin
Naples and the Defence of the Latin East: Robert the Wise and the Naval League of 1334,”
Byzantion 51 (1981), 548–56, at 551.
48 For the League of 1332–34, see in general: Vladislav Ivanov, “Sancta Unio or the Holy
League 1332–36/7 as a Political Factor in the Eastern Mediterranean and the Aegean,”
Études Balkaniques 48 (2012), 142–76 (and notes 3–7 for references to earlier literature);
Spyridon Theotokes, “Η πρώτη συμμαχία των κυρίαρχων κρατών του Αιγαίου κατά της
καθόδου των Τούρκων αρχομένου του ΙΔ ́ αιώνος” [“The First Alliance of the Sovereign States
of the Aegean against the Expansion of the Turks in the Early 14th Century”], Επετηρίς
Εταιρείας Βυζαντινών Σπουδών 7 (1930), 283–98; Paul Lemerle, L’émirat d’Aydin, Byzance et
l’occident: Recherches sur “La geste d’Umur pacha” (Paris, 1957), pp. 92–98; Elizabeth A.
Zachariadou, Trade and Crusade: Venetian Crete and the Emirates of Menteshe and Aydin:
1300–1415 (Venice, 1983), pp. 21–40. For a Byzantine source celebrating the victory at
Adramyttion, see: Vitalien Laurent, “Action de grâces pour la victoire navale remportée
sur les Turcs à Atramyttion au cours de l’automne 1334,” in Εις Μνήμην Κ. Αμάντου 1874–1960
[In Memory of K. Amantos 1874–1960] (Athens, 1960), pp. 25–41.