“Paci cation” Ë 109
coordinating resistance with the Azeris, had already been arrested in February. Conse-
quently their plans for insurrection became known to the Soviet government and thus
appeared infeasible. But in view of the international situation, the Menshevik lead-
ers decided to proceed with their plans. On the eve of Britain and France’s diplomatic
recognition of the USSR, they wanted to prove that the Georgian people did not ac-
cept the Soviet occupation. Taking into account that Georgia was the only Caucasian
republic recognized de jure by the Allies, the Social Democrats hoped that mass up-
risings there would force France (which hosted the Georgian government in exile in
Paris) to preserve the international stature of Georgia as an independent state. The
Georgian government in exile also hoped that on the eve of the USSR’s recognition
by Western powers, the Kremlin would be obliged to refrain from massive repressive
measures against the rebels.¹²
While the general uprising was planned for 29 August, already on 28 August the
small village of Chiatura in eastern Georgia had revolted. There, Russian troops de-
ployed an airplane and machine-gunned the rebels, who carried slogans such as: “Lib-
erate Georgia and Restore its Independence,” “Liberate the Country from the Commu-
nist Traitors,” “Protect Private Property,” and “Protect Religion.” As during the Russo-
Japanese War, Guria became a major center of rebellion, where nearly ten thousand
men were armed.¹³But the rebels fought against insurmountable odds; the enemy
forces, familiar with the insurrection plans through intelligence, appropriately de-
ployed military forces. Additionally, the insurrection failed to spread to major centers
such as Ti is and Batumi or national minority regions, although parts of Abkhazia did
join the rebels. After a week of ghting, the rebellions were crushed (although those in
Abkhazia continued a few more days, and in some areas the Red Army fought against
the “bandits” well into October 1924).¹⁴In these few days of uprising, as many as 12,578
prisoners were killed by the Communist government (not counting those who died in
action).¹⁵
12 See Mamoulia,Les combats indépendandistes des Caucasiens, 81–85. The Menshevik leaders
abroad knew that without working together with the Azeris and peoples of the Northern Caucasus,
the plan would be suicidal. See Markus Wehner, “Le soulèvement géorgien de 1924 et la réaction des
Bolcheviks.”Communismenos. 42/43/44 (1995), 158. Some historians suspect that the Georgian secret
police deliberately “encouraged the rebellion so they would have a pretext for destroying all politi-
cal opposition.” See Amy Knight,Beria: Stalin’s First Lieutenant(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1993), 32.
13 Mamoulia,Les combats indépendandistes des Caucasiens, p. 85.
14 Note the military records in Rossiiskii gosudarstvennyi voennyi arkhiv (hereafter RGVA), Moscow,
Russia, f. 25873, op. 1, d. 1113.
15 Wehner, “Le soulèvement géorgien de 1924,” 160 and Wojciech Materski, “Powstanie narodowo-
wyzvoleńcze 1924 r. w Gruzii.”Studia dziejów Rosji i Europy Śródkowo-Wschodniejv. 34 (1999), 63—64.
See also the account by a Polish diplomat held in a prison in Georgia at the time: Andrzej Furier, “Rela-
cja Józefa Łaszkiewicza o gruzińskim powstaniu antybolszewickim 1924 r.,”Pro Georgiavol. 7 (1998),
147–148.