154 Ë The Caucasus Group and Japan
ligence to each other, Germany and Japan were also to exchange their views of the in-
telligence shared. This secret agreement was o cially approved by the Japanese army
and the German Wehrmacht (armed forces) on 7 October 1937, with additional clauses
on conducting joint anti-Soviet counterintelligence and holding an annual meeting to
exchange and evaluate the intelligence shared between the two countries.¹⁰¹
The most interesting part of the agreement is the “Additional Protocol concerning
‘Anti-Soviet’ Plotting and Subversion (boryaku ̄ ,Zersetzungsarbeit).” In it, Germany
and Japan agreed to collaborate in encouraging all national minority movements
within the Soviet Union, promoting anti-Bolshevik propaganda, and instigating rev-
olutionary activities, terrorist acts and sabotage activities at the outbreak of war.
Further, the additional protocol speci ed that the main spheres of action be divided
between the two countries: (1) the western borderlands (from Finland to Bulgaria)
would belong mainly to Germany, (2) the southwestern borderlands (Turkey and Iran)
to both, and (3) the eastern Asiatic front primarily to Japan. Clause Seven of the pro-
tocol, for example, stated that in case one party was drawn into war with the Soviet
Union, the other would be obliged to escalate diversionary tactics by “all means pos-
sible” in the areas of primary interest (the western borderlands for Germany and the
eastern, Asiatic front for Japan) as well as the area of mutual interest (the southwestern
borderlands). The action plan of the protocol covered ve years, from 1937–1941.¹⁰²
TheOshima-Canaris agreement also included as an appendix an intriguing ve- ̄
year plan of joint action in the Caucasus area. For 1937, for instance, it included the
following to be accomplished in Turkey: contacting and bribing important political
gures, establishing contacts with “military sites” (the general sta), and building
secret stations at several points near the Soviet borders (under the guise of commer-
cial ventures).¹⁰³The 1937 plan for Europe included training cadres recruited from the
Soviet Caucasus and dispatching them back into Soviet territory. The 1938 plan for
Turkey envisaged strengthening and increasing border stations, founding communi-
cation links through Black Sea boats, setting up courier routes, training and placing
border crossers, and establishing cells in the Caucasus area and links with them.¹⁰⁴
Similar plans for Iran were drawn up for 1938. The 1939 plan for Turkey included es-
tablishing radio communication, studying airport construction, and training a core
group for the creation of a Caucasian Army; the plan for Iran included establishing
101 Tajima,Nachizumu kyokuto senryaku ̄ , 208–09. Julius Mader,Hitlers Spionagegenerale sagen aus:
Ein Dokumentarbericht über Aufbau, Struktur und Operationen des OKW-Geheimdienstamtes Aus-
land/Abwehr mit einer Chronologie seiner Einsätze von 1933 bis 1944(Berlin: Verlag der Nation, 1971),
197–98 and 314–15 discusses this agreement, which dates it to June 1938, which seems to be a mistake,
although possibly an additional agreement was signed at that time.
102 See Hiroaki Kuromiya and Georges Mamoulia, “Anti-Russian and Anti-Soviet Subversion: The
Caucasian-Japanese Nexus.”Europe-Asia Studies61, no. 6 (2009), 1,427.
103 Kuromiya and Mamoulia, “Anti-Russian and Anti-Soviet Subversion,” 1,427–1,428.
104 Kuromiya and Mamoulia, “Anti-Russian and Anti-Soviet Subversion,” 1,428.