The Eurasian Triangle. Russia, the Caucasus and Japan, 1904-1945

(WallPaper) #1

182 Ë War and Dénouement


less sincere in this matter. Berlin did invite Moscow to join the three countries, and in


November 1940 Moscow did respond by sending for negotiation Commissar of Foreign


Aairs Viacheslav Molotov to Berlin. Yet both sides understood that this would be an


impossible alliance, and nothing came of it. Japan still clung to the illusion, however,


thus concluding on 13 April 1941 a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union, ignorant that


four months earlier Hitler had already decided to start war against the Soviet Union by


mid-1941. Moscow benetted enormously from the fact that the alliance between Japan


and Germany was an “inoperative alliance.”⁴⁸At the same time, the Soviet-Japanese


neutrality pact was a huge blow to those Caucasians and other émigrés who had long


worked with Japan against Moscow.


Turkey, which cautiously kept all options open regarding the Soviet Union even


when it concluded a pact of mutual assistance with Britain and France, also concluded


a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union (on 24 March 1941). Preceding Japan’s neutral-


ity pact with the Soviet Union by three weeks, it signied another serious blow to the


anti-Soviet forces working within and outside Turkey. Thus, to be safe, Turkey signed


a non-aggression treaty with Germany as well. This was 18 June 1941, four days before


the Germans invaded the Soviet Union.


7.4 The Expansion of War


Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa against his life-time enemy, Soviet Bolshevism,


on 22 June 1941, having kept his allies, Italy and Japan, in the dark about his secret


plan. Within Japan’s political and military establishment, there were those who, op-


posing the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty, wished to join the Germans in launch-


ing war against the Soviet Union in the East. Ultimately, however, Japan chose to go


southward to attack American, British, and Dutch interests in order to secure its oil


supply. In September 1940, Japan’s quagmire in China led to its invasion of north-


ern Indochina (now under the control of Vichy France) to cut the supply line of arms


to Chinese forces. But this only strengthened American military and nancial aid to


China and hardened Washington’s resolve against Japan. In July 1941, Japan invaded


and occupied southern Indochina to secure the raw materials of Southeast Asia. In re-


sponse, the following month the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands imposed


an oil embargo on Japan. This was a crucial move jeopardizing Japan’s war machine


because Japan depended on the United States for more than 80 percent of its oil sup-


ply. This is the immediate background to Japan’s decision to launch war against the


United States and its allies instead of going northward to attack the Soviet Union. This


48 The expression “inoperative alliance” (die wirkungslose Allianz) is taken from Theo Som-
mer,Deutschland und Japan zwischen den Mächten 1935–1940: Vom Antikominternpakt zum
Dreimächtepakt(Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1962), 450.

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