182 Ë War and Dénouement
less sincere in this matter. Berlin did invite Moscow to join the three countries, and in
November 1940 Moscow did respond by sending for negotiation Commissar of Foreign
Aairs Viacheslav Molotov to Berlin. Yet both sides understood that this would be an
impossible alliance, and nothing came of it. Japan still clung to the illusion, however,
thus concluding on 13 April 1941 a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union, ignorant that
four months earlier Hitler had already decided to start war against the Soviet Union by
mid-1941. Moscow benetted enormously from the fact that the alliance between Japan
and Germany was an “inoperative alliance.”⁴⁸At the same time, the Soviet-Japanese
neutrality pact was a huge blow to those Caucasians and other émigrés who had long
worked with Japan against Moscow.
Turkey, which cautiously kept all options open regarding the Soviet Union even
when it concluded a pact of mutual assistance with Britain and France, also concluded
a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union (on 24 March 1941). Preceding Japan’s neutral-
ity pact with the Soviet Union by three weeks, it signied another serious blow to the
anti-Soviet forces working within and outside Turkey. Thus, to be safe, Turkey signed
a non-aggression treaty with Germany as well. This was 18 June 1941, four days before
the Germans invaded the Soviet Union.
7.4 The Expansion of War
Hitler launched Operation Barbarossa against his life-time enemy, Soviet Bolshevism,
on 22 June 1941, having kept his allies, Italy and Japan, in the dark about his secret
plan. Within Japan’s political and military establishment, there were those who, op-
posing the Soviet-Japanese neutrality treaty, wished to join the Germans in launch-
ing war against the Soviet Union in the East. Ultimately, however, Japan chose to go
southward to attack American, British, and Dutch interests in order to secure its oil
supply. In September 1940, Japan’s quagmire in China led to its invasion of north-
ern Indochina (now under the control of Vichy France) to cut the supply line of arms
to Chinese forces. But this only strengthened American military and nancial aid to
China and hardened Washington’s resolve against Japan. In July 1941, Japan invaded
and occupied southern Indochina to secure the raw materials of Southeast Asia. In re-
sponse, the following month the United States, Britain, and the Netherlands imposed
an oil embargo on Japan. This was a crucial move jeopardizing Japan’s war machine
because Japan depended on the United States for more than 80 percent of its oil sup-
ply. This is the immediate background to Japan’s decision to launch war against the
United States and its allies instead of going northward to attack the Soviet Union. This
48 The expression “inoperative alliance” (die wirkungslose Allianz) is taken from Theo Som-
mer,Deutschland und Japan zwischen den Mächten 1935–1940: Vom Antikominternpakt zum
Dreimächtepakt(Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1962), 450.