190 Ë War and Dénouement
ter Germany’s inevitable loss. Among them, Mikheil Kedia and other émigré leaders
needed to protect themselves and those who had fought on the German side against
the Soviet Union. Fortunately, their interests and those of the United States now co-
incided, and thus already in 1944 Kedia oered his services (“the use of his Georgian
intelligence network, with it’s [sic] outposts allegedly reaching as far as Moscow”) to
the US O ce of Strategic Services (OSS, the CIA’s predecessor). By this time, US intelli-
gence was keenly interested in the Soviet Union as a potential rival and enemy. Under
possible threat from the Soviet Union, Turkey, in turn, was “pushing hard for close
Turkish-American relations, for substantial American economic and military aid, and
for a solid American defence commitment.” Turkey thus appeared to Americans as
“the perfect base for ‘JE-Land [Soviet Union] Operations’.”⁸⁴Like many Muslim lead-
ers from Azerbaijan and the Northern Caucasus, Kedia had maintained amicable re-
lations with key gures in the Turkish government, and so was a valuable asset to
the United States and Turkey. Thus Kedia, Alikhan Kantemir, A. Atamalibekov (Azeri),
and A. Dzhamalian (Armenian), as well as Gerhard von Mende came to be recruited by
the OSS (Operation Ruppert), and US-Turkish cooperation came into being by the be-
ginning of 1945.⁸⁵Sensing the victory of the Allied forces, Turkey had already severed
diplomatic ties with Germany in August 1944, and on 5 January 1945, it also broke o
diplomatic relations with Japan. On 23 February, Turkey declared war on both coun-
tries.⁸⁶
It was only in March that the German government, urged by Kedia and others,
was forced to acknowledge, de facto, the independence of the Caucasus.⁸⁷Needless
to say, this acknowledgment came too late and was of no practical signi cance. From
February 1945, Kedia and other Caucasian leaders negotiated in Geneva with the Inter-
national Red Cross and the Allies to secure for former Soviet citizens (many of whom
fought in theOstlegionenand other military units against the Soviet Union) the right
to remain in the West if they so wished. Yet this led nowhere, for their fate had already
been sealed at the Yalta Conference in February of that year. Gerhard von Mende,
the German expert who worked with these Caucasians, estimated very roughly that
one hundred thousand Caucasians were repatriated to the Soviet Union, though some
reckon this gure is too low.⁸⁸
84 Burds, “The Soviet War against ‘Fifth Columnists’,” 309–10. See also Mamoulia,Les combats in-
dépendandistes des Caucasiens, 327–38.
85 Burds, “The Soviet War against ‘Fifth Columnists’,” 311.
86 See Önder,Die türkische Außenpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg, 240 and Johannes Glasneck and
Inge Kircheisen,Türkei und Afghanistan – Brennpunkte der Orientpolitik im Zweiten Weltkrieg(Berlin:
Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, 1968), 156–57.
87 See Mamoulia,Les combats indépendandistes des Caucasiens, 325. Kedia and others sent a num-
ber of ultimatums to Rosenberg, demanding that “the Reich recognize the [Caucasian] separatists as
‘equivalent partners and allies’ ” and that unless this was done, “we can no longer assume any respon-
sibility before our peoples or Germany.” See Dallin,German Rule in Russia, 629.
88 See von zur Mühlen,Zwischen Hakenkreuz und Sowjetstern, 227.