The Expansion of War Ë 191
In all these events, Japan appeared to remain marginal owing to the neutrality
pact concluded with Moscow in April 1941. Bammat lived in Switzerland aloof from in-
ternational politics, although from 1943 he served as Afghanistan’s diplomatic repre-
sentative in Switzerland. After the Hotel Adlon meeting in Berlin, Bammat entertained
more sympathy with Japan (which was not ghting against the Soviet Union) than with
Germany (which actually was). Bammat also maintained close contact with Japan’s
ambassador to Germany,Oshima, and Japan’s military attaché in Turkey, Tateishi. ̄
After January 1945, Turkey broke relations with Japan, Tateishi faced the possibility
of detention by Turkish authorities. He thus instructed his colleagues in Europe that
Bammat be used as his intermediary for communication and gave them Bammat’s ad-
dress in Lausanne, Switzerland: Bammat in turn was to forward all communication
to Japan’s legation in Bern. Tateishi added: “I think you know BAMATE [Bammat].
He has cooperated with Japan for many years, and has particularly close connections
with Lt. GeneralOshima. I have not gotten in touch with him about these letters [which ̄
Tateishi was to write in plain text in English or French and send from Turkey], but I
think he will gladly undertake the business.”⁸⁹
During the war, although clearly Japan did not play a critical role, it nevertheless
appeared to support the national aspirations of the Caucasian émigrés. After Hitler’s
attack on the Soviet Union, Moscow pressured Afghanistan, a neutral country, to ex-
pel the nondiplomatic personnel of Germany and Italy. Japan, on the other hand, ex-
panded its intelligence activity in this neutral state, despite the Afghan government
attempt to restrict these endeavors. Japan persisted, and, with the implicit support of
Turkish intelligence, it continued working with leaders from among émigré Muslims
of the Soviet Union.⁹⁰Bammat’s status as the Afghan government representative in
Switzerland no doubt helped Japan keep its options open against the Soviet Union in
the Caucasus and Central Asia.
In his last political publication released in July 1943 under a pen name, Bammat
continued urging Germany to recognize the independence of the Caucasus and help
liberate it from the Russian yoke. He also expressed hope that Turkey would contribute
to liberating not only the Caucasus but also Turkestan and Idel-Ural (Volga-Ural). Al-
though Bammat’s hopes were to be dashed, his views proved prescient: the “total vic-
tory” of Britain and the United States over the Third Reich, achieved with the help of
Moscow, exposed Turkey to great danger from the Soviet Union. Already in 1943 he
89 NARA RG457, Japanese Attaché Messages 1943–1945, SRA 15,001–15,800, Box. 20 (SRA 15687, 23
January 1945).
90 See Patrick von zur Mühlen, “Japan und die Sowjetische Nationalitätenfrage am Vorabend und
während des Zweiten Weltkrieges”Vierteiljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte21, no. 3 (1973), 330–31, and
Glasneck and Kircheisen,Türkei und Afghanistan, 259–60.