The Impact of Japan’s Victory Ë 57
at the time, “This is the beginning of a new era in world history.”¹⁶In the Caucasus and
its surrounding areas, too, the euphoria over the humbling of Russia by a tiny Asian
power was palpable.
The Ottoman Empire, a colonial empire long in decay under the pressure of Euro-
pean imperial powers, was also emboldened by Japan’s victory over Russia, an empire
that more than any other had contributed to its own decline. Its defeat in the last war
against Russia, in 1877–78, was still fresh in the memory of the Ottomans. In 1908, in-
spired at least partly by Japan, the Young Turks staged a successful revolution against
the sultan’s autocratic power, ushering in a progressive, modernizing, and constitu-
tional era.¹⁷
Japan’s victory was hailed in Persia as well, as it signaled the weakening of its op-
pressive neighbor to the north. The victory also represented the triumph of the trans-
formation of a tradition-bound society into a modern, industrial one. Japan thus be-
came “the model of Asian progress for the Iranian nationalists.” Persia, too, aspired to
become a constitutional polity; after all, Russia had also been forced to adopt a quasi-
constitution. Japan’s constitution was even translated into Persian. Persia’s constitu-
tional revolution, however, did not last long, eventually being nulli ed by Russia and
Britain’s partitioning of Persia, according to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907.¹⁸
The repercussions of Japan’s victory went much further still, aecting national
groups within the Ottoman and Persian realms. Having witnessed the defeat of their
patron (Russia) in the Far East, the Slavic states in the Balkan Peninsula became
convinced that “ultimately they would have to rely upon themselves to realize their
national aspirations against the Ottomans.” The Great Power equilibrium thus dis-
rupted, Bulgarian, Greek, and Serbian nationalists adopted “Japanese methods” of
ghting in the Balkan Wars of 1912–13, namely, oensive warfare characterized by “di-
rect infantry assaults and indirect artillery support” and reinforced by self-sacri cing
élan. Although this tactic was often merely a metaphor for scaring the enemy (the
Ottomans), it nevertheless was eective and indeed frightened the Ottoman soldiers.16 Quoted in Rotem Kowner, ed.,The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War(London–New York: Rout-
ledge, 2007), 304.
17 On Japan’s impact on Turkey, see Handan Nezir Akmese,The Birth of Modern Turkey: The Ottoman
Military and the March to World War I(London–New York: I. B. Tauris, 2005), 72–79; on Japanese-
Turkish relations, see Selçuk Esenbel and Chiharu Inaba (eds.),The Rising Sun and the Turkish Cres-
cent: New Perspectives on the History of Japanese Turkish Relations(Istanbul: Boğaiçi University Press,
2003).
18 See Janet Afary,The Iranian Constitutional Revolution, 1906–1911(New York: Columbia University
Press, 1996) (quoted passage, “the model of Asian progress... ,” on p. 181). For Japan’s impact on the
Middle East in general, see also Renée Worringer, ed.,The Islamic Middle East and Japan: Perceptions,
Aspirations, and the Birth of Intra-Asian Modernity(Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener, 2007).