“Spy Mania” Ë 63
3.4 “Spy Mania”
Despite Russia and Japan’s political rapprochement, they never stopped considering
each other potential foes. On the contrary, both sides, or to be more exact, a consid-
erable section of military leaders in both countries, continued to regard the other as a
dangerous rival.
Russian war planning in 1910, for example, included Japan: the plan, which was
“the rst in Russian imperial history that developed full mobilization schedules for
combat on the entire Eurasian continent,” provided for “war against China, Japan,
China and Japan in alliance, war in the Caucasus, and war in Turkestan, while at the
same time continuing to provision for the traditional European threat.” In general,
the Russian military were “unplacated by the assurances of their diplomatic counter-
parts that the 1907 Anglo-Russian Convention and later agreements with Japan had
eectively neutralized the threat from that direction.”³⁹Russia’s strengthening of its
military forces in Asia in general unnerved Tokyo, which in turn enlarged its military
presence in Korea.
Moreover, Russia’s virtual control of Outer Mongolia greatly alarmed Japan. Hav-
ing long engaged in various political machinations to extend its in uence to Inner
Mongolia and eventually to Outer Mongolia as well, Japan in turn schemed to de-
tach Manchuria and Inner Mongolia from China under Japanese aegis.⁴⁰Although
Japan’s attempt failed, owing to pressure from Britain and Russia, numerous inde-
pendent Japanese schemers (called continentalronin ̄ ) continued to engage in political
and military intrigues in China and Inner Mongolia in response to the perceived Rus-
sian threat. Often the Japanese government was unable to control these independent
schemers, who were assisted by sympathizers in the Japanese military. Japan’s oper-
ations had also already extended to Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan) during the Russo-
Japanese War.⁴¹In 1912, when Japan and Russia negotiated a clear demarcation of their
respective spheres of in uence in Inner Mongolia, Russia demanded exclusive “spe-
cial interests” in “Western China” (i.e., Xinjiang). Tellingly, Japan refused,⁴²although
this was an area lying directly on Russia’s borders but thousands of kilometers from
Japan! (The distance between Tokyo and Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, for example,
is approximately 4,500 kilometers, or 2,800 miles.) Because it was a strategic area that
would link Japan to Central Asia (Russian Turkestan), the Caucasus, and the Middle
East, Japan refused to give in.
39 Alex Marshall,The Russian General Sta and Asia, 1800–1917(London–New York: Routledge,
2006), 101.
40 See Masaru Hatano,Manmo dokuritsu und ̄ ̄o(Tokyo: PHP Kenky ̄ujo, 2001).
41 JACAR, reference code: B03050330700. See also Michio Yoshimura, “Nichiro senso ki no Nihon no ̄
tai-M ̄oko seisaku no ichimen: ‘Kharachinofu kenbunroku’ i tsuite.” ̄ Seiji keizai shigaku300 (1991), 183.
42 Michio Yoshimura, “Dai san kai nichiro kyoyaku seiritsu zengo: rom ̄ ̄o ky ̄oyaku to no kanren ni
oite.”Kokusai seiji31 (1966), 74.