The Eurasian Triangle. Russia, the Caucasus and Japan, 1904-1945

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World War I Ë 77


Caucasus would make it impossible for Russia to continue this war, prompting it to


conclude peace with the Central Powers. This would extend Germany’s inuence to


the Caucasus and all the way to Central Asia as well.¹⁵In 1916–17 Germany did help


the Georgians transport weapons and ammunition and political activists to the Cau-


casus using submarines,¹⁶enterprises clearly inuenced by the expedition of theSir-


ius. Hidden by local National Democrats (see p. 80) in secret stores in Georgia, the


weapons and ammunition delivered from the German U-boats played an important


role in arming the military units of National-Democrats and Socialist Federalists. Us-


ing these weapons, they subsequently conducted secret operations against Russian


authorities and troops in 1917 and in the spring of 1918 resisted the Ottoman troops


invading the Caucasus.¹⁷


The Georgian National Committee also organized a special Georgian Legion, a


legion of ghters for Georgia’s independence, funded by the Germans and deployed


by the Ottomans. Both Germany and the Porte promised independence for Georgia


in exchange for their service. Comprising both Christian and Muslim volunteers and


refugees (including the Northern Caucasian “mahajirs” or immigrants and refugees


who settled in Turkey in the nineteenth century) and ghting under a Georgian ag,


the Legion was not generally trusted by the Turks. Small in numbers (formed only on


a battalion level) and poorly armed, they made little contribution in military terms.¹⁸


The legion’s commander, Leo Kereselidze (discussed in Chapter 2) and his brother


Giorgi also sent agents inside the Russian Caucasus, where in 1915 a clandestine


branch of the Georgian National Committee was created.¹⁹In June 1916, Prince Mach-


abeli himself, Selim Bey Bebutov, an Azeri, Murat Gazavat (Uzden Arzamakov), a


Chechen, and two other Georgians were successfully dispatched by a German U-boat


to Georgia. It is dicult to conrm whether their work had any signicant impact.


But soon the Russian autocracy collapsed. By the summer of 1917, Prince Machabeli


returned to Berlin by way of Petrograd (as St. Petersburg was renamed in 1914), Japan,


and the United States.²⁰Whether he made any contact with Japanese authorities is


unknown.


There is little indication of Japan’s contact with Caucasian independence ghters


during the war. This is partly explained by Japan’s brief alliance with Russia: in 1916,


15 HHStA, PA, I 947 Krieg 21 k Türkei: Georgisch-grusinischer Aufstand im Kaukasus 1914–18, fols.
42-49.
16 Georges Mamoulia,Les combats indépendandistes des Caucasiens entre URSS et puissances occi-
dentales: Le cas de la Géorgie (1921–1945)(Paris: L’Harmattan, 2009), 198.
17 See Davit Vachnadze, “samshoblos samsakhurshi” [On the service of the Motherland].Iveria
(Paris), 1990, no. 35, 35–68.
18 Bihl,Die Kaukasus-Politik der Mittelmächte, 63, 82, 238. Among the leaders of the Legion was the
Georgian Muslim Osman Bey Kartsivadze (79 and 81).
19 Mamoulia,Les combats indépendandistes des Caucasiens, 15.
20 Bihl,Die Kaukasus-Politik der Mittelmächte, 72.

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