The Eurasian Triangle. Russia, the Caucasus and Japan, 1904-1945

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86 Ë War, Independence, and Reconquest, 1914–21


idea of creating a unied Caucasian state as the only viable option, it also accepted


the demand of some German military commanders that it constitute itself as an inde-


pendent state to be recognized as the legitimate representative of the Northern Cauca-


sus peoples. (In truth, the German commanders were interested in eventually annex-


ing the Northern Caucasus to the German Empire.)⁴⁷Thus, on 11 May 1918, the Union


(or at least those who claimed to represent it), appealing to Germany and Turkey for


support, declared independence and created the Republic of the Mountaineers of the


Northern Caucasus and Dagestan (the “Mountaineer Republic”).⁴⁸The new Republic


was headed by Tapa (Abdul Medzhid) Chermoev (1882–1937), a Chechen, with Haidar


Bammat (Bammatov) (1890–1965), a Dagestani lawyer, serving as foreign minister.⁴⁹


Chermoev and Bammat were the two who signed the 11 May declaration. While Russia


denounced this move, it was recognized by Georgia.


There was a serious problem, however: the Mountaineer Republic claimed areas


that it did not control, such as the Terek and the Kuban regions. In fact, it hardly con-


trolled other regions it claimed, such as Chechnia and Dagestan.⁵⁰Moreover, the inde-


pendence proclamation had been issued in Batumi, which was under Turkish control.


The political situation in the Northern Caucasus had also grown complex, with insur-


gents and Cossack ghters rising in various places against whoever controlled them.


But, in October and November 1918, both Turkey and Azerbaijan came to the aid of the


new republic to expel the Bolsheviks and the Entente-oriented White Russian forces


from the Northern Caucasus.⁵¹Germany, far from united in its policy toward the North-


ern Caucasus, was deeply disturbed by the advance of Turkish forces into the area, yet


it did not dare jeopardize the Brest-Litovsk Treaty with Russia.⁵²Ultimately, as Bam-


mat bitterly complained later, Germany failed to keep its earlier promise to support


47 See Werner Zürrer, “Deutschland und die Entwicklung Nordkaukasiens in Jahre 1918.”Jahrbücher
für Geschichte Osteuropas, 26, no. 1 (1978), 38.
48 SeeSoiuz ob”edinennykh gortsev, 121.
49 On Bammat, see Georges Mamoulia, Khadzhi Murad Donogo, and Mairbek Vatchagaev,Gaidar
Bammat i zhurnal “Kavkaz”(Makhachkala–Paris: Akhul’go, 2010).
50 The Republic left the question of its southern borders open for future unication with the Southern
Caucasus.
51 See Vassan-Giray Jabagi (Cabagi), “Revolution and Civil War in the North Caucasus–End of the
19th—Beginning of the 20th Century.”Central Asian Survey10, nos. 1-2 (1991), 124–125 and Pshemakho
Kosok, “Revolution and Sovietization in the Northern Caucasus.”Caucasian Review(Munich) 1956,
no. 3, 51. For more details, see Georges Mamoulia, “Kavkaz i derzhavy Chetvernogo soiuza v 1918 g.”
Nowy Prometeusz5 (2013), 156–158.
52 Winfried Baumgart, “Das ‘Kaspi-Unternehmen’ – Größenwahn Ludendors oder Routineplanung
des deutschen Generalstabs?”Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas18, no. 1 (1970), 99–106.

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