108 CHAPTER THREElegions were surely responsible for the spurt in road construction after 69,
which among other things eased exchange between city and country and be-
tween Palestine and its neighbors, and the effect on the local economy of the
presence of approximately 10,000 cash-rich troops, though incalculable, was
probably not negligible.^10 A complicating factor for the present purposes is
that neither legion was stationed in Jewish territory, though the VI Ferrata, in
Legio-Capercotna (Kefar ‘Othnai), was only some twenty-five kilometers from
Sepphoris by a new road. Until the mid-third century legionary detachments
and auxiliary units were scattered around the country. The mounting prosper-
ity of Palestine, including Jewish Palestine, in the second and third centuries,
which may have culminated in a partly trade-fueled boom of the fourth
through sixth, would have been impossible without direct Roman rule.
But Palestine’s prosperity mounted only gradually, and as far assomeJews
were concerned was insufficient compensation for Roman depredation. At
first, the consequences of the failed revolts were the most pressing concern of
these Jews. Many people had died or been enslaved; many others had fled.
Ancient writers provide amazingly high numbers for casualties and prisoners,
which are as always best ignored.^11 There is, however, no reason to doubt the
extent of the depopulation and dislocation they imply, especially in Judaea
proper, which had been the center of both revolts. Idumaea and Peraea were
less affected, Galilee and Golan least.
Probably everywhere, though, the failure of the revolts had led to disaffec-
tion wit hand attrition from Judaism.^12 4 Ezra, an apocalyptic book composed
(^10) See in general Isaac,Limits of Empire, pp. 104–18. Z. Safrai, “The Roman Army in the
Galilee,” inGalilee, pp. 103–14 was right to insist on the economic and social importance of the
army but went too far. On Roman roads, see the detailed discussion in B. Isaac,The Near East
under Roman Rule(Leiden: Brill, 1998), pp. 48–75.
(^11) For the Great Revolt, see Josephus, War 6.420: total number of prisoners, 97,000; total
number of those killed in siege of Jerusalem, 1.1 million (the smaller number of prisoners is
obviously the more plausible, and it could be argued that Josephus may even have had access to
official figures; the number of dead cannot have been other than guesswork). For the Bar Kokhba
revolt, Cassius Dio (apud Xiphilinus) 69.14.1: fifty Judaean fortresses and 985 villages destroyed;
580,000 Jews were killed in battle, and the casualties of famine and disease were innumerable.
See comments of M. Stern,GLAJJII, no. 440. For a general discussion of the statistics provided
by ancient writers, see Parkin,Demography, pp. 58–66.
(^12) The standard discussions of “responses to the destruction,” e.g., B. Bokser, “Rabbinic Re-
sponses to Catastrophe: From Continuity to Discontinuity,”PAAJR50 (1983): 37–61; M. Stone,
“Reactions to Destructions (sic) of the Second Temple,”JSJ12 (1981): 195–204, cf. also S.
Cohen, “Significance of Yavneh,” tend to concentrate on explicit post-70 discussions of the de-
struction—mainly 4 Ezra and similar works, and the heavily homiletic discussions in rabbinic
literature, composed centuries after the event. Such accounts often describe the Destruction as
a theological problem to which various intellectuals found generally acceptable solutions. Cohen
observes that the earliest rabbinic literature manifests little direct concern with the Destruction.
But when this literature was written, the Destructionwasno more than a theological problem—
a suitable topic for somber moralizing reflection. This is not to deny that rabbinic Judaism was