communities when a person bore an unresolved claim against someone else
in the community.^73 It seems that in this case, rabbinic authorities went to great
lengths to convince her not to press charges and to attempt a conjugal union.
Finally, they submitted a decision to grant her a divorce and give her her ke-
tubbah. It is clear, however, that this case dragged on for quite some time and
that this woman had to insist in order to retain her financial rights.^74
In these examples from the twelfth century, the wife’s complaint is eventu-
ally accepted and a divorce is procured for her. Yet it is important to note that
in both cases, the wife’s testimony is not the only evidence. In the case brought
before the Riz·ba, the husband admitted that he had a problem. In the second
case, the husband displayed the outward signs of a eunuch. The many years
one of the women in fact spent with her husband—sixteen—and the Riz·ba’s
ruling that she give up her financial rights as a condition for divorce are evi-
dence of the growing struggle women faced when demanding divorce and of
the rabbinic attempts to limit their ability. The two twelfth-century sages ex-
amined here had different opinions regarding monetary arrangements. Riz·ba
thought that a woman who claimed her husband was impotent should forfeit
her rights to her ketubbah in order to be believed, whereas Rahaviah said that
if her claim can be proved, she is to receive her ketubbah. During the thir-
teenth century, this issue is discussed further. Grossman has suggested that the
increase in the number of impotence claims might have resulted from the reg-
ulations instituted limiting women’s abilities to procure divorce writs. Con-
sequently, one of the only claims available to women was an accusation of
impotence.^75
Although Riz·ba’s approach became the standard one, and women who
claimed that their husbands were impotent were expected to give up their ke-
tubbah, some authorities did not accept even this ruling. R. Meir of Rothen-
burg (d. 1293), who wished to limit the phenomenon of divorce, and especially
divorce instigated by women, suggested that in his day too many women were
attempting to procure divorces on grounds of impotency.^76 He thus argues that
impotence should not be automatic grounds for divorce. His opinion, however,
was not accepted and the Riz·ba’s ruling continued to prevail.^77 In short,
women could obtain divorces if they argued that their husbands were impo-
tent, but they did have to give up some money in the process, and this money
was especially precious to a divorcée who probably wished to remarry. Fur-
thermore, this accusation was viewed with increasing suspicion. In many cases,
women came under pressure from various quarters and had to be both daring
and insistent in order to present their cases. If we try to map out a general trend,
it becomes clear that women’s ability to procure a divorce on the grounds of
infertility became more restrictive over time.^78
The grounds for women’s entitlement to a divorce writ were not religious
per se; rather, they were based on understandings of women’s nature and of her
role in childbirth and procreation. Women’s rights were restricted by a basic
rick simeone
(Rick Simeone)
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