116 CHAPTER FOUR
It is nevertheless noteworthy that Maimonides’ usually in dependent mind
does not exert itself in this matter, where he adopts a rather conservative
view, even for his times. By comparison, his contemporary Averroes de-
plores the loss of material gain to society, which, confi ning women to
procreative and domestic roles, forces them to vegetate at home.^141 Aver-
roes’s words are not in dependent statements; they are offered as a com-
mentary on Plato’s Republic and elaborate Plato’s ideas. It is nevertheless
remarkable that Averroes allows himself to toy with novel ideas regarding
the place of women in the workforce, and to make penetrating, critical
observations regarding his own society. No such ideas are contemplated
by Maimonides.
Maimonides’ conservative position is manifest not only in his philo-
sophical ruminations but also in his stringent legal rulings. A poignant
example can be seen in a case in which a neglectful, idle husband forbids
his wife from teaching in order to earn the family’s daily bread, and
threatens to take a second wife if she continues to do so. Members of the
community appeal to Maimonides in support of the wife. They expound
in great length the misery in which the wife lives, her resourcefulness, her
dignifi ed behavior despite abject poverty, and the husband’s consistent
neglect to provide for his family. They also seem to suggest, in the ques-
tion itself, that Jewish law supports her case, since the husband is in dis-
dain of his obligations in the marriage contract: “He does not provide her
with food, drink or clothing, and does not do anything which the Torah
commands.” Maimonides, however, upholds the husband’s right to pre-
vent his wife from working. As a ruse to regain her liberty, he suggests
that she should provoke a divorce by becoming “a rebellious wife,” and
thus forfeit her right for her muakhkhar.^142 Maimonides acts here strictly
within the law; but despite his use of the word “ruse,” there seems to be
little effort on his part to fi nd a helpful interpretation of the law. The dif-
ference between his position and that of the supplicants (in all likelihood
men like him, and apparently with some learning) is also striking. His
v. Maimonides,” in Aviezer Ravitzky, ed., Joseph Baruch Sermoneta Memorial Volume
(Jerusalem Studies in Jewish Thought 14; Jerusalem, 1998), 113– 28 [Hebrew], esp. 121.
(^141) See Averroes’ Commentary on Plato’s Republic, 54; see also R. Lerner, Averroes on
Plato’s Republic (Ithaca and London, 1974), 59. Averroes’ commentary, preserved only in
a medieval Hebrew translation (and Latin translations made from the Hebrew), was re-
translated into Arabic by A. Shahlan; see Ibn Rushd, al-Daruri fi’l-siyasa—mukhtasar kitab
al-siyasa li- Aflatun (Beirut, 1998), 144; see also M. A. al- Jababiri’s analysis of this passage,
ibid., 61– 63.
(^142) Responsa, 49– 53. For another version of the same case (probably an earlier version, re-
counted from the husband’s point of view), see Responsa, 71– 73. The muakhkhar—the
late installation of the wedding gift— was part of the wedding contract (ketubah). In case of
divorce or of the husband’s death, this money served women for alimony or as life insur-
ance; see Goitein, Mediterranean Society (1967), 1: 369; (1978), 3: 250, 267.