76 CHAPTER THREE
Averroes, on the other hand, does not use the term batin in this con-
text (an omission that looks like a conscious choice to avoid this term).
He juxtaposes the zahir with the muawwal (“interpreted”), and it seems
that he understands zahir as it has been understood by Dawudal-Zahiri
and by Ibn Hazm—that is to say, as the primary lexical meaning of each
word on its own.^100 Without a contextual meaning, the zahir of a verse
can hardly be reconciled with its philosophical meaning. The dichotomy
between the two levels thus makes the exposition of the multitudes to the
esoteric meaning even riskier, and one can see why Averroes was ada-
mant against such an exposition.
Unlike Maimonides’ Guide, Averroes’s Kashf does not intend to dis-
close the philosophical secrets, because, as noted by Pines, Averroes’s
position on such disclosure differs from that of Maimonides.^101 Pines ap-
proached both authors in the context of Almohad theology, a theology
that imposed on the multitudes a nonanthropomorphic understanding of
the Scriptures. While Averroes regarded this development as both unreal-
istic and imprudent, Maimonides adopted it.
Indeed, it is noteworthy that, although Maimonides was probably in-
fl uenced by Averroes, their positions on some issues are diametrically
opposed. They agree on the legitimacy of tawil, and on its philosophical
necessity; but they disagree on the necessity to divulge it. Averroes speaks
resolutely against divulging the details of the tawil, and he is even op-
posed to declaring the very principle of God’s incorporeality.^102 Maimo-
nides, on the other hand, adopted the Almohad position and imposed on
the multitudes— simpletons, children, and women— a catechism that de-
clared God’s incorporeality, just as it declared His unity.^103
By shaping a compact and authoritative Code of Law, and by includ-
ing indoctrination in the Code, Maimonides was playing the role as-
signed to the ruler according to the Platonic philosophical tradition: the
role of the lawgiver who builds a virtuous city, the one who guides his
fl ock toward true beliefs. The idea that the phi losopher must play this
role was, of course, part of the Hellenic legacy. Maimonides’ defi nition
of the exact pa rameters of this role, however, refl ects, as I hope to have
shown, a strong Almohad infl uence.
Moreover, it is not only Maimonides’ overall perception of the role of
the ruler that is modeled according to Almohad thought. Several of its
implementations may also refl ect this infl uence. As mentioned above, Ibn
(^100) For Averroes’s defi nition of tawil, see Fasl, 119.
(^101) Pines, “A Lecture on the Guide of the Perplexed,” 117– 18.
(^102) SeeKashf, 138– 41, and see his diplomatic retraction in the second recension; see also
note 97, above.
(^103) Guide, 1.35 (Dalala, 54– 55; Pines, 79– 81).