The Habsburg Brothers’ Feud 97away from Habsburg control and establishing them as a principality for
himself and his heirs. Secondly the Hungarians, while acknowledging
Habsburg sovereignty, insisted that this should be exercised through
Matthias rather than Rudolf, only reluctantly relinquishing their orig-
inal demand that the title of king of Hungary should be transferred
to him. Moreover the actual government was to be in the hands of a
paladin elected by the Hungarian Estates from their own high nobil-
ity, while ethnic Germans and other foreigners were to be excluded
both from holding office and from owning lands in Hungary. Thirdly
religious freedom was to be guaranteed for the nobility, free cities, mar-
ket towns with royal charters and for the troops defending the borders.
Details were left vague, but this freedom was understood to apply not
only to Catholics and Lutherans but also to Calvinists. These religious
concessions were the hardest for Matthias to make, but practical politics
decided the issue, even Khlesl eventually conceding that ‘on the subject
of religion we will have to bite into the sour apple’.^4
Bocskay and the Hungarians were also insistent that peace should be
made with the Turks, so that another prolonged negotiation followed,
leading to the peace of Zsitva Torok in November 1606. Essentially this
confirmed the Turks in possession of all that they had gained, includ-
ing advances made during the Bocskay rebellion, while the Habsburg
side had to be satisfied with mere face-saving concessions, including the
commutation of the long-standing annual tribute paid to the sultan in
respect of Hungary into a one-off lump sum, together with the latter’s
agreement to recognise the emperor for the first time as a monarch of
equal standing to himself.^5
Although these two agreements averted the crisis, and the terms were
the best obtainable in the circumstances, they were undoubtedly humil-
iating defeats for the Habsburgs. Bocskay and the Hungarian rebellion
had been bought off rather than suppressed, while the Turks had made
peace for reasons of their own, including a threat from the Persians
in the east, rather than having been repulsed militarily. A breathing
space had been gained, but little reliance could be placed on the treaty’s
twenty-year truce, so that expensive defensive measures would have to
be maintained nevertheless. Far from being relieved Rudolf was furious,
viewing the outcome in Hungary as a victory for the Protestants and
a successful rebellion by the Estates. For this he blamed Matthias, the
principal object of his suspicion and antipathy. Although he reluctantly
ratified the agreements he set out to undermine them, and before long
he was threatening to reopen the wars even though the means to do
so were as lacking as before. Thus Matthias, having narrowly averted