Matthias’s Reign, Ferdinand’s Succession 119of Matthias, problems only arising when these appeared in danger of
conflicting. His importance for Matthias’s career cannot be overstated,
another biographer contending that he was ‘the significant adviser who
propelled his insignificant master into a historic role’.^3
Even Matthias’s religious outlook stemmed largely from Khlesl, it
has been suggested. Unlike his elder brothers, Matthias was not sent
to Spain as a youth, being brought up instead mainly at the German
court of his father, Emperor Maximilian II, under whose influence
he developed a leaning towards Lutheran books and practices, while
his youthful escapades during the early years of Rudolf’s reign gave
rise to family and papal fears that he might become a Protestant. It
was only after he had formed a close association with Khlesl that
Matthias turned to conventional Catholicism and became a protagonist
of counter-Reformation.^4
Khlesl, on the other hand, became more pragmatic in his later years,
holding to his beliefs but moderating his tactics to accommodate the
needs of practical politics as the emperor’s principal minister. ‘I too’,
he wrote, ‘was once hot-headed in pursuing theological objectives, but
anyone in the emperor’s service today must approach matters quite dif-
ferently in order to keep affairs of state in equilibrium. Theology calls
for many actions which are not viable in politics.’^5 By the time of
Matthias’s accession Khlesl had recognised that the old Catholic objec-
tive, maintained since the first years after the Reformation, of reuniting
the confessions, was no longer achievable. Hence as the only alterna-
tive to a political accommodation would ultimately be a religious war,
he viewed reaching an understanding with the Protestant princes as an
obligatory duty.^6
Rather than Matthias’s reign being important only because of the
defenestration, it is possible to argue almost the opposite, that but for
the defenestration it might well have been important. Thus Wilson
notes that ‘Matthias’s succession in 1612 saw many problems being tack-
led with considerable success’ so that by 1618 ‘some confidence had
been restored in the Habsburgs and there was little to suggest that the
Empire was on the brink of catastrophe. However the period of recovery
was too short to make up the ground that had been lost.’^7 Parker likewise
observes that ‘to make Bohemia’s Letter of Majesty similarly immutable
and respectable [to the Magna Carta and other great political conces-
sions of European history] required only time’, but time ran out with
the defenestration.^8
The limited but nevertheless real progress made in the Empire in
response to Matthias’s and Khlesl’s more conciliatory policy has been