No Way Back 157That they should have done so is not surprising given the previous
history. They had done the same thing twice before in the preceding ten
years at times of crisis and confrontation with their king and emperor.
Moreover the same key individuals were involved. Of the thirty direc-
tors and three military commanders appointed in 1618 half had held
office in either 1609 or 1611, many of them in both. At the top of the
hierarchy nine of the thirteen lords and commanders had served before,
and almost all the real leaders had done so on both occasions, notably
Schlick, Thurn, Ruppa and Wilhelm Lobkowitz, while Budowetz had
been a director in 1609 and also an active participant in 1611. Of the
few newcomers at this level all but one, Smiˇrický, were close relatives
of previous directors, and only among the least influential, the repre-
sentatives of the cities, were most relatively inexperienced, although
Fruewein himself had also served twice before.^4 This level of experience
may well have been one of the principal problems, in that the leading
figures in this group of men had twice faced down Emperor Rudolf II and
won major concessions from him, while in 1611 they had also largely
dictated the terms of Matthias’s accession. Against this background the
speed with which the estates converted a constitutional crisis into a
full-scale armed rebellion certainly suggests over-confidence.
The Saxon ambassador reported back to the elector that there were
only a few men of political ability and intellect among the new direc-
tors, the remainder being colourless and insignificant personalities, and
it is hard to disagree with him.^5 Schlick, like Thurn, seems to have owed
his prominence more to his leading rank as a count than to any polit-
ical talents, and his employment in drafting the rebels’Apologiarather
than as head of the directorate doubtless reflects this judgement among
his contemporaries. Instead the leading position went to Ruppa, a man
of more evident ability who had been active in the Estates during the
turmoils of the previous decade, although not in the forefront. Leading
a government required different talents to agitating in opposition, and
for this Ruppa’s administrative experience and knowledge of foreign lan-
guages were his main recommendations. Budowetz, on the other hand,
was essentially a religious agitator, a firebrand member of the Bohemian
Brethren who in his younger days had spent time in the Ottoman
Empire, learned Arabic, and used this skill and experience to publish a
hostile commentary on Islam. Some historians have referred favourably
to the 23-year-old Smiˇrický, although the evidence for his ability is less
well established and he did not live long enough to demonstrate it
during the revolt.^6 For the rest, the more able were probably among
the bourgeois members, who did much of the actual administrative