184 The Origins of the Thirty Years War and the Revolt in Bohemia, 1618
forces had not at that stage been directly involved, many soldiers had
been recruited in the Netherlands for the emperor’s army, which was
led by former Spanish officers, and more active intervention by Spain
was a very evident possibility. Maximilian of Bavaria had been recruit-
ing troops since December 1618, ostensibly for his own self-defence, the
Catholic League was showing signs of resurrecting itself, and even the
pope had become slightly more open-handed with financial support.
More immediately, however, the issue of the Imperial succession had to
be addressed, and so the Union met again in Heilbronn in June 1619.
The old demands were rehearsed once more, but with a new emphasis
as aKompositionhad become much less likely since Khlesl’s deposi-
tion. Instead, with Ferdinand in control of Imperial policy, it was feared
that there might be a counter-attack rather than concessions from the
Catholic side, and political and legal action on former church proper-
ties might even be backed with military force if an army were to become
available after suppression of the revolt in Bohemia. A clear element of
self-interest thus underlay the discussions, particularly for the Lutheran
princes who had substantial secularised land-holdings at stake.
In these uncertain circumstances the Union members had a new and
direct interest in the survival of the Bohemian revolt, rather than it
being solely a question of religious solidarity. Their first step was to
agree a joint guarantee for a substantial loan to the Bohemians, the
cash for which was then advanced by the city of Nuremberg. Their sec-
ond was to decide to raise an army of their own, 8000 infantry and
3000 cavalry. Although the usual militants led by Christian of Anhalt
saw in this the potential for more direct involvement the majority
remained as cautious as ever, viewing the force as solely for self-defence.
In fact it was essentially a deterrent, both to any possible threat to the
Union members themselves, and also to outside intervention against the
Bohemians, whether by Bavaria, by the Catholic League, or by Spanish
forces attempting to pass through Germany from the Netherlands. The
proposed army was large enough for this purpose but probably too small
for effective independent campaigning, and that it was not intended for
any proactive use, or indeed to fight at all, is indicated by the carefully
modest financial provision which the Union made. After a period of
peace it had adequate funds, principally in the form of outstanding nor-
mal contributions, to finance an army of this size for up to ten months,
so they were able to proceed without calling for additional payments
from the membership. In the event there was a 30 per cent shortfall in
collecting the cash due, so that the funds were sufficient only for one
campaigning season, effectively little more than the rest of 1619.^10