The Origins of the Thirty Years War and the Revolt in Bohemia, 1618

(Michael S) #1
The Search for Allies 185

Although the Union members had also hoped to use the Bohemian
revolt as a reason for postponing the Imperial election, perhaps paving
the way for a subsequent displacement of the Habsburgs or even open-
ing up the possibility of a Protestant emperor, they were unsuccessful
in this, and Ferdinand was elected two months after their meeting. The
election of Friedrich V of the Palatinate as king of Bohemia in the same
week posed a new problem for the Union, and the members met again
in Rothenburg in mid-September specifically to consider whether he
should be advised to accept the election or not. The risk was obvious.
Were he to accept he would become king of a territory already at war
with the Habsburg emperor, and his own Palatinate would inevitably be
involved. The logical response to prevent its resources being deployed
in Bohemia would be a Spanish Habsburg assault on the Palatinate itself
from the Netherlands, a circumstance which would activate the Union’s
obligation to come to the defence of an attacked member, hence draw-
ing it into the war. Predictably there was a split of opinions, but it made
little difference as Friedrich made up his mind to accept in any case.
More significant was a decision to call yet another meeting, and this
time to invite not only Union members but representatives of Protestant
territories throughout Germany in an effort to form a wider united front.
The significance lay, however, not in any positive results, but in the
weakness, divisions and indecisiveness which it demonstrated. When
they gathered in Nuremberg in mid-November 1619 the Union mem-
bers were joined by representatives of only seven other principalities, all
small apart from Brandenburg, and even these had only watching briefs
with no powers to make commitments on behalf of their princes.^11
The Union members themselves were confronted with one of the
classic military problems of the age, the difficulty of maintaining a
significant-sized army without active employment. This was not only a
question of expense but also of logistics. The number of human mouths
to feed – not to mention the horses – was usually roughly double the
number of enlisted men, the balance being made up of wives, chil-
dren, servants, soldiers’ boys, carters, sutlers and hangers-on of many
kinds. Even in summer such numbers quickly exhausted the resources
of any one area, and unless the army was kept on the move feeding it
properly soon became impracticable, while with the approach of win-
ter the situation worsened rapidly unless the troops could be dispersed
into suitable quarters. Thus it had long been recognised that recruiting
an army, even if initially for purely defensive reasons, frequently led to
pressure to actually deploy it, or at the least to attempt to occupy winter
quarters in a prospective enemy’s territory.

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