186 The Origins of the Thirty Years War and the Revolt in Bohemia, 1618
There was also the financial problem. The Union’s initial reserve of
contributions was being rapidly used up and a new levy would soon be
required, but the cities were unwilling to pay more while many of the
princes were already substantially in arrears. On the other hand the situ-
ation appeared no less threatening than it had at Heilbronn five months
before, so that it might be necessary to maintain a contingency or deter-
rent army for an indefinite period. In these circumstances a division
of opinion rapidly emerged between the more impetuous princes, who
advocated actually using the army in one way or another, and the more
cautious members, mainly but not exclusively the cities, who viewed it
as less risky and also cheaper to remain on the defensive for the time
being.
There were also differing views among the activists. Christian of
Anhalt had been appointed as general by the Bohemian Estates a month
before Friedrich actually accepted the crown, and he was now in com-
mand of all the Palatine and Bohemian forces, so that he naturally
wanted the Union army to join them in the war against Ferdinand.^12
This was at least a realistic proposition, as although the Union force was
relatively small it was still large enough to play a valuable and possibly
even decisive role in Bohemia. The proposal was, however, completely
contrary to all the basic provisions of the Union constitution, and it
also carried the clear risk of involving the Union in a long-drawn-out
and escalating conflict. Others suggested using the army for some form
of pre-emptive strike against the Catholic party in Germany, an idea
which was as ill-considered as it was ill-defined. This too would have
been in contravention of the strictly defensive limitation, as well as rais-
ing fears of another princely debacle similar to the Strasbourg incursion
at the time of the Cleves-Jülich crisis. Only slightly less aggressively,
the margrave of Baden-Durlach suggested marching the army into the
territories of the ecclesiastical electors to find its winter quarters.^13
There was, however, one other way to use the army without further
major expense or risk, and that was as implicit backing for a bold line in
negotiations. The principal concern, particularly of the princely mem-
bers, remained not the situation of the Bohemian Protestants, nor even
religion as such, but the old search for security in their possession of
secularised church properties. Hence it was agreed to present the long-
standing demands once again to the emperor, but more particularly to
Maximilian of Bavaria, as the head of the re-formed Catholic League,
with the stipulation that the latter should respond within two months
giving categorical assurances on behalf of the Catholic estates that they
would accede to them. Failing a reply, or if the reply were unsatisfactory,