192 The Origins of the Thirty Years War and the Revolt in Bohemia, 1618
was five years older they had overlapped during their time at the Jesuit
university of Ingolstadt, so that they knew each other well, although
not to the extent of personal friendship.
Maximilian’s initial reaction to the Bohemian rebellion had been that
although he was very much aware of its wider general significance he
did not want to be drawn into the conflict, and like other princes of
the Empire he was not prepared to respond to the repeated pleas of
Emperor Matthias for military or financial help. The most he would do
was to accede to an Imperial request for a prohibition on recruiting for
the Bohemians in Bavaria, as well as refusing passage through his duchy
to troops intended for supporting the Bohemians but allowing it for
Spanish forces.^23 It was already clear from this and from Maximilian’s
circumspect approach to renewing the League that he would not be
easily persuaded to hasten to Ferdinand’s assistance, and that he was
unlikely to take either political or financial risks on the latter’s behalf
without adequate security and good prospects of advantage for himself.
Ferdinand had already had exploratory talks with the three ecclesiasti-
cal electors before leaving Frankfurt, where it was agreed in principle
to raise a League army which would both protect the League members’
territories and support the emperor, but he knew that Maximilian was
the key figure, and his situation was such that in the end he had lit-
tle choice but to accept what one historian has described as ‘a Bavarian
Diktatto the desperate emperor’.^24 The negotiations were carried out not
by Ferdinand and Maximilian in person, but by two leading councillors
of each, together with a corresponding representative of the ecclesias-
tical electors, while the Spanish ambassador Oñate was also present at
Maximilian’s invitation. They took only a week to reach an agreement,
the Munich compact of 8 October 1619.^25
Under this contract Maximilian agreed to take full control of the
League forces and to assist the emperor, but with the proviso that as
future circumstances were as yet uncertain ‘he committed himself to
nothing specific, other than that he would not omit to do anything
which was in his power to do’, the definition of which was left entirely
up to him. No member of the house of Habsburg would seek to interfere
in the conduct of the League, and Maximilian was recognised both by
Ferdinand and by the ecclesiastical electors as sole head for operational
purposes. The agreement gave him almost total discretion in deciding
upon action, which he was not obliged to take until he was fully sat-
isfied with both the provision of finance and the state of readiness of
the forces, however pressing the emperor’s military situation might be.
It was also provided that there were to be no negotiations or treaties