194 The Origins of the Thirty Years War and the Revolt in Bohemia, 1618
it was very doubtful whether such a proposal was either legal or within
the powers of the emperor, but Ferdinand had little choice but to agree.
To give effect to it would cause a furore in the Empire, but that was a
problem to be faced later if keeping the promise could not somehow be
avoided.
Once Maximilian’s stipulations had been accepted it only remained
for the provisions of this Munich compact to be confirmed at the first
joint meeting of the reconstituted League, held at Würzburg in Decem-
ber 1619, and for larger-scale recruiting to be put in hand, with an agreed
target of an army of 21,000 infantry and 4000 cavalry.^27 Potentially deci-
sive help for Ferdinand in 1620 was on the way, but there was still much
diplomatic work to be done to secure the necessary wider support and
finance.
The cautious Maximilian had imposed one further condition. An
advance against the Bohemians would have to be accompanied by
a diversionary attack from the Spanish Netherlands on the principal
Rhineland section of the Palatinate, thus pinning down its and the
Protestant Union’s forces there and preventing any possible retaliatory
attack on League territories in Germany. Furthermore 1000 Spanish
cavalry should be provided to serve with the League army itself. This
was the purpose of Oñate’s presence in Munich, and he, in agreement
with Archduke Albrecht, gave the necessary assurances, although at
that point without the authority of the government in Madrid, whose
consent was as yet by no means certain.^28
Bethlen Gabor
Meanwhile the Bohemians had to contend with a major worry about
their principal military ally, Bethlen Gabor, who by early 1620 was play-
ing a double game. He had already startled them during the previous
summer by the extent of his ambitions, floating the idea of seizing most
of the Austrian lands and adding them to his own in the course of
their joint campaign, but his real target was Habsburg Hungary. Thus
although his withdrawal in November 1619 had ended the second siege
of Vienna, this was a greater loss for the Bohemians than for him, as
his more important objective had been the capture of Pressburg, which
he continued to hold. He then entered into parallel negotiations with
the Bohemians on the one hand and with the emperor on the other,
aiming to extract the maximum advantage for himself in respect of title
and territorial possessions, either by forcing concessions from Ferdinand
or by fighting against him. His opening demand was that in return for