198 The Origins of the Thirty Years War and the Revolt in Bohemia, 1618
further, dispensing with the need for a warning order in such circum-
stances. Whether these took precedence over the emperor’s accession
oath provided scope for endless debate among constitutional lawyers,
but the political reality was that using a legally contentious procedure
to pave the way for dispossessing a leading Protestant prince would
inevitably alienate other Protestant princes, not least because of the
precedent which it would create. Anxious not to reduce the chances
of recruiting Protestant supporters, Ferdinand called for advice from the
princes meeting at Mühlhausen, where they eventually opted for the
middle way of 1555, that Friedrich should be ordered to quit Bohemia
within a specified time, a conclusion which conveniently postponed the
real decision. All concerned also skirted round the problem that it was
a matter of legal dispute whether Bohemia was part of the Empire at
all, and hence whether the revolt was an Imperial concern or only an
internal Habsburg problem.^33
In the event no other Protestant prince was prepared to join Johann
Georg in assisting the emperor militarily. At a meeting of the Upper
Saxon Circle in Leipzig the best he could achieve, and that by a bare
majority, was a decision to raise a small force for six months for the
defence of the Circle itself, and moreover on condition of strict neu-
trality. Even that force did not materialise, as the more important
principalities, including Brandenburg and Pomerania, voted against,
and they subsequently refused to pay their shares of the prospective
costs, while the Lower Saxon Circle would not go further than a com-
mitment to neutrality. The elector’s discomfort was increased by internal
opposition to his policy within Saxony itself, so that he had to avoid
putting it before the Estates, while Christian IV of Denmark wrote urg-
ing him not to enter an alliance with those whose ultimate objective was
the destruction of the Protestant religion.^34 Johann Georg hesitated, but
he was too far committed to withdraw with honour and the prospective
rewards still attracted him, although in his final response mention of the
transfer of the un-named principality had disappeared, probably out of
consideration for Protestant susceptibilities. Hence he merely insisted
that actually applying the Imperial ban to Friedrich must be postponed,
while refusing to commence his own advance until Maximilian was well
under way with a full-scale attack on Bohemia.^35 Consequently although
Ferdinand issued an ultimatum to Friedrich, giving him until 1 June to
withdraw or face the ban, for the time being he went no further, but in
mid-May he nevertheless authorised Johann Georg to proceed against
Silesia and Lusatia, and Maximilian to make a start by subjugating Upper
Austria.^36