The Revolt Defeated 207on the long-standing list of Protestant grievances which had been the
subject of their delegation to Munich the previous December.^9 Regard-
ing the guarantee against attack, they noted that the League was ready to
offer a reciprocal undertaking not to attack any member of the Union,
but this did not go far enough. Archduke Albrecht was not a League
member, so that the guarantee should be extended to preclude him from
attacking the Palatinate. Moreover were Friedrich to be placed under the
Imperial ban the emperor could appoint a suitable prince to enforce the
sentence by invading and seizing the former’s Palatinate territory. Such
an enforcer would almost certainly have to come from the ranks of the
League, with Maximilian himself by far the most likely candidate, so
that the proposed treaty should specify that not only the League itself,
but also all its individual members, were to be precluded from attack-
ing any Union member, even in the guise of an Imperially appointed
executor.
Sensing his opponents’ weakening resolve, Maximilian declined these
terms, and even when the Union gave way about an Imperial execution,
although still insisting on the inclusion of Archduke Albrecht in the
agreement, he remained intransigent.^10 Contacts continued for more
than a week, during which the Bavarian envoys made efforts to drive
a wedge between the cities and the princes, but by 28 June negotia-
tions had broken down.^11 Even so Maximilian wrote to Albrecht that
the Union members were realising that things were not going well for
them, as a result of which they were showing a greater readiness to com-
promise in order to avoid war.^12 Hence he took the opportunity to invite
French mediation.
France had watched the war in Bohemia and the competitive recruit-
ment in Germany with increasing concern, largely through fear that the
conflict between the confessions would aggravate their own problems at
home, but also because a victory for either side would have been almost
equally unwelcome to them. As Catholics they did not want to see a
Protestant success at any time, and certainly not when it would encour-
age their own dissident Huguenot minority, but a Catholic triumph
would also be a Habsburg triumph, and worse still one which might lead
to Spanish Habsburg control of territory uncomfortably close to France
in the Palatinate. Nevertheless during the latter half of 1619 France was
contemplating providing military support for the Habsburg invasion of
Bohemia, responding to appeals for solidarity among Catholic monarchs
against Protestant revolt despite long-standing French anti-Habsburg
policy. Although there was considerable internal opposition Louis XIII’s
personal inclination in this direction prevailed, and planning to send