214 The Origins of the Thirty Years War and the Revolt in Bohemia, 1618
only when in a superior position and with superior numbers, but even
then as a last resort. Rather than seek out and confront an enemy army,
control should be extended over territory, cities should be besieged, and
resources should be denied to the opposing forces until they were too
weak to resist further. It was a concept which did much to explain the
long duration of the war in the Netherlands, but which also ensured
that defeat was avoided even if a quick victory could not be achieved.
Tilly had learned his profession in the same environment, and he was
inclined to a similarly methodical approach, but he also had experience
of a different kind of war in Hungary, so that he was prepared to be
more venturesome when the situation demanded it.^27 Maximilian, with
no military training or experience, was less able to appreciate the risks
but more aware of the constraints of time, money and politics which
required a quick resolution of the issue, certainly before the winter gave
the Bohemians and their allies time to build up their forces further.
The immediate question was whether to commence an advance on
Prague or to follow Christian of Anhalt and his Bohemian army, which
had retreated from Lower Austria into Moravia as the League army
approached. Bucquoy was strongly in favour of the latter, not in order
to force Anhalt to battle but to hold him in check so that he could
not besiege Vienna again as soon as the Imperialists and their allies
moved north. This was exactly what the Bohemians and Bethlen had
actually planned to do, and although Bucquoy was probably unaware
of that he was certainly conscious of the danger of Bethlen appearing
in the field in the autumn with a large and mobile army, just as he
had done the previous year. Here too there was a difference of out-
look between the commanders. Bucquoy was jealous of his standing
as the emperor’s general, and he was determined to maintain both his
own independence and his master’s interests, including defending his
capital city. Maximilian was less concerned about Vienna and equally
determined that his own objective, the defeat of the Bohemian revolt
before the winter, should be given top priority. Consequently he and
Tilly argued that an advance on Prague would also protect Vienna, in
that Anhalt would be obliged to follow suit to defend the Bohemian
capital. It was an argument which was more convenient than convinc-
ing, as Anhalt might well have called the bluff and reached Vienna first,
forcing Bucquoy to turn back to relieve the city, but in the end it carried
the day. Dampierre was left with a mere 6000 men to protect Vienna,
and Bucquoy reluctantly joined the march north.
Smaller towns on the way were easily captured, but the substantial
city of Pilsen presented a greater problem, as it was still occupied by