234 The Origins of the Thirty Years War and the Revolt in Bohemia, 1618
on Friedrich was to be withdrawn and his Palatine lands were to be
restored to him, the rights and religious freedom of the Bohemians were
likewise to be restored, and the Imperial and League armies were to be
demobilised. The threat was viewed seriously by the emperor and his
councillors, but it was not long before both they and Christian himself
began to realise that the will to back it up was lacking. The north-
German princes were not prepared to take the risk, James I was anxious
not to imperil his efforts to arrange a Spanish marriage for his son, and
the Dutch were increasingly preoccupied with the resumption of their
war with Spain, while even Christian’s own council would not agree to
raising the necessary troops.^12
Meanwhile with the truce coming to an end it was in the Dutch inter-
est for Spanish forces to remain embroiled in Germany, so in February
1621 Friedrich was able to beg and borrow enough money to re-engage
Mansfeld, then still securely fortified with his men in Pilsen. Although
he had long been unpaid and had been inactive during the last stage
of the revolt, the general had earlier managed to acquire many of the
Palatine and privately recruited troop units which had made their way
to Bohemia from the west, so that by this time he had a considerable
army, which he had also protected from attack after the defeat of the
revolt by agreeing a six-week truce with Tilly in January.^13 He was able
to supplement his numbers further by recruiting men from the rem-
nants of the Bohemian army, and after he was forced out of Pilsen at
the end of March he broke through into the Upper Palatinate in May,
where he was followed and confronted by Imperialist units and part
of the League army under Tilly’s command. Both sides were cautious,
digging themselves into fortified positions and skirmishing for the next
four months while Maximilian delayed, seeking to increase the pressure
on Ferdinand as they haggled over Friedrich’s property. When the duke
finally sent reinforcements in mid-September the resourceful Mansfeld,
better at tactics than pitched battles, slipped away with his army under
cover of darkness to begin a forced march across Germany, reaching the
Rhine and the Lower Palatinate two weeks later, although he lost many
men on the way. This was a military failure for Tilly, but it was a politi-
cal success for Maximilian, who thus occupied the Upper Palatinate and
secured control of one part of Friedrich’s territories.
On the other hand the episode also delayed Maximilian’s intended
seizure of the part of the Lower Palatinate east of the Rhine, where
he planned to forestall any possible Spanish move to extend their area
of control. Tilly’s army too now hurried westwards, ostensibly pursu-
ing Mansfeld, who moved on into Alsace, but actually aiming at the