250 The Origins of the Thirty Years War and the Revolt in Bohemia, 1618
to him it must also be accompanied by the former, without which
the validity of the transfer would be open to challenge, and he added
force to his objections by pointedly delaying his advance into the
Upper Palatinate. The resulting wrangling went on for a further year,
as Maximilian refused to give way, while Ferdinand wanted to secure
concessions ‘before he let the trump card of the electoral transfer out of
his hand’.^37
The delay provided scope for opposition to develop, not only from the
expected quarters led by the elector of Saxony, who correctly predicted
that a transfer of the electoral title would be a source of new conflict
in the Empire, but also on the Catholic side. The elector of Mainz, sup-
ported by the elector of Trier, was strongly opposed, on the grounds
that a transfer could prove an enduring obstacle to conciliation with
the conservative and more pro-Imperial Protestants princes. The Spanish
ambassador Oñate was also a leading and vocal opponent, fearing that
such a provocative move could result in a new anti-Habsburg alliance in
the Empire and in Europe, which England might join, a prospect which
was particularly unwelcome to Spain in view of the recently resumed
warintheNetherlands.^38 The arrival of James I’s envoy in Vienna dur-
ing July 1621 to intercede on behalf of Friedrich added force to this
argument, and even in the emperor’s own privy council most of the
leading members were against proceeding with the transfer. The new
pope Gregory XV was among the few who were firmly in favour, send-
ing legates to Madrid and Vienna to lobby for the transfer, while the
Jesuits, among them the confessors of some leading princes, likewise
provided support.^39
Caught between his military dependence on Maximilian on the one
side, and wide opposition to the transfer on the other, Ferdinand even-
tually opted for a middle way, so that on 22 September 1621 he issued
the formal hereditary transfer secretly to Maximilian, with the condi-
tion that it would only be confirmed publicly once the consent of Spain
and Saxony had been secured. Knowledge of this was confined on the
Imperial side to two principal councillors, together with the papal rep-
resentative and Ferdinand’s confessor, and on Maximilian’s to a few
confidantes, while the matter was handled so secretly that Stralendorf,
the vice-president of the Imperial privy council, himself wrote out the
lengthy document, foregoing the usual use of parchment and the great
seal. Although the pope’s agent was a strong advocate of this stratagem,
Maximilian himself may well have suggested it as a means to commit
Ferdinand irrevocably to the transfer, while the latter’s anxiety to get
Maximilian to move against the Upper Palatinate was probably also
significant.^40