From Bohemia to the Thirty Years War 255Denmark, although still concerned about what he regarded as the
Habsburg threat, was deeply disillusioned after that setback, and a year
later, in February 1622, he rebuffed a mission from the Palatine coun-
cillor Camerarius with another repetition of his advice to Friedrich to
seek reconciliation with the emperor. There were also serious tensions
between the prospective northern Protestant allies. Denmark and the
United Provinces were commercial rivals, while the former had long
maintained surprisingly good relations with Spain, which the Dutch
viewed with deep suspicion. Danish tolls on shipping passing in and
out of the Baltic through the Sound, and Dutch efforts to control the
north German estuaries were significant issues, with the latter leading
to a clash between warships of the two countries in the spring of 1623.^45
Moreover Denmark and Sweden were at daggers drawn, with open war
between them more than once threatening to break out in the early
1620s. All of them regarded England as unreliable because of James I’s
vacillation between seeking support for Friedrich over the Palatinate and
endeavouring not to upset the Spanish marriage negotiations, so that
his change of policy after the latter collapsed met with considerable
scepticism.
Denmark, which then included Norway and the southern part of
modern Sweden, had traditionally been the dominant Scandinavian
power, but growing Swedish ambitions had led to a war in 1611, result-
ing in a crushing Danish victory. As a result the young King Gustavus
II Adolphus, who came to the Swedish throne in 1612, had inherited
major problems and a massive reparations liability, but had amazed con-
temporaries by not only paying off the debts but coming off best in a
war with Russia, before going on to attack Polish Livonia in 1617 and
again in 1621 after a period of truce. His military talents and evident
territorial ambitions not only made him an uncomfortable neighbour
for Christian IV, but also made Gustavus himself potentially receptive
to suggestions that he might both enhance his reputation and further
his own interests by becoming the Protestant champion in Germany.
On a visit to Stockholm in November 1623 Camerarius was indeed
able to elicit an agreement in principle from the king to intervene in
Germany, but while various schemes were floated Gustavus’s principal
concerns remained Denmark and Poland. He had agreed a year’s truce
with the latter in July 1622, subsequently prolonged into 1624, despite
which Sigismund III was busy preparing an invasion of the Swedish
mainland, so that this war was no more than in abeyance.^46 At the same
time Gustavus was threatening Denmark with war over various disputed
issues as well as demanding exemption from the Sound toll for Swedish