An Inevitable War? 45nature of this creed, encapsulated in its description of the Catholic Mass
as ‘accursed idolatry’, alarmed many, not least Emperor Maximilian II,
who saw it as a threat to his efforts to reduce religious tensions in
the Empire.^38 Accordingly, and despite Elector Friedrich III’s claim that
he conformed to the Augsburg Confession, at the Reichstag of 1566
Maximilian moved to have the Palatinate formally excluded from the
protection of the peace. For this he sought Lutheran support, which he
duly received from a number of the Palatinate’s political and religious
opponents, notably the dukes of Württemberg and Pfalz-Zweibrücken.
An open split in the Protestant ranks was avoided by the mediation of
the elector of Saxony, and the proposal was dropped, but from that time
onwards it was clear both to the Palatines and to other princes who
converted to the Reformed religion that their position in the Empire
was at risk, and moreover that they could not count on support from
their Lutheran brethren.^39 As the Counter-Reformation developed, those
of a Reformed or Calvinist persuasion were much more inclined than
the Lutherans to see it as a concerted Habsburg-led Catholic onslaught
aimed at nothing less than the complete eradication of Protestantism,
in which they themselves would be the first targets. Hence they became
the most militant advocates of Protestant self-defence and the leaders of
the anti-Imperial and anti-Catholic political manoeuvres in the Empire
in the decades before the Thirty Years War.
A further significant difference between the Protestant confessions
concerned the attitude to authority. Following Luther’s own teaching,
mainstream Lutheranism prescribed a Christian duty of obedience to the
established worldly authorities, notably princes. Conversely, although
less formally incorporated into doctrine, Calvinist circles claimed that
subjects had a natural right of resistance to an unjust prince. At a prac-
tical political level these contrasting approaches manifested themselves
on the one hand in the view of many Lutheran princes, usually led by
Saxony, that it was both incumbent upon them, and also expedient, to
attempt to cooperate with the Catholic hierarchy, and particularly the
emperor, in the interests of the common good. Calvinists, on the other
hand, with the Palatinate usually in the forefront, were inclined to reject
cooperation in favour of confrontation, both within the institutions of
the Empire and if necessary outside them, including in the last resort by
military means.
The ‘Protestant’ position at any given time and on any given issue
in the Empire thus did not constitute a unified common stance, but
reflected instead the current state of an unstable and shifting balance
of influence between militants and moderates. The composition of the