94 Wallenstein
something of them indirectly, perhaps from conversations in a coach
travelling back or subsequently in Vienna, but certainly his knowledge
was only partial and his reporting was selective and slanted. However
his central thesis corresponded sufficiently to one possible interpreta-
tion of the observed facts to alarm not only Maximilian but also the
other Catholic princes to whom he promptly circulated the report.
According to Magni, Wallenstein’s – and by implication the emperor’s –
intention was to maintain a large army not so much to defend the
Empire as to oppress it, so that power would shift to the centre at
the expense of the princes and their cherished freedoms. Exactly this
apprehension underlay the duality evident in Maximilian’s policies
throughout the Thirty Years War, a duality in which loyalty to the
Empire and its institutions conflicted with the fear that it might acquire
real power and subordinate the principalities to an incipient centralised
state. Although by no means its sole source the memorandum played
on this anxiety, conditioning princely attitudes, particularly among the
Catholic League, to Wallenstein and his Imperial army. Their resulting
hostility largely explains the paradox that Wallenstein’s most influential
long-term opponents were not the Protestant but the Catholic princes
of the Empire, foremost among them Maximilian himself.
The matters actually discussed at Bruck can be deduced from subse-
quent events, and from the new appointment document which was
eventually issued on 21 April 1627.^24 They were clearly important
enough for Eggenberg to need to consult the emperor, as Wallenstein’s
letters after the conference show him waiting impatiently for their for-
mal confirmation. Strategy will certainly have been on the agenda, but
the practical issues were men, money, and Wallenstein’s own authority.
Military expectations for the following year required more, not fewer
men, Wallenstein evidently argued, so that his depleted forces were
not merely to be rebuilt but expanded by new recruitment. Moreover
he could no longer fund their pay, so that a formal tax levy on the
hereditary lands was required. To ensure a unified strategy he should
command not only his own army but all Imperial forces wherever they
might be. This latter point was not accepted for another year although
some concession was made, as Wallenstein began to sign colonels’
commissions in his own right rather than referring them to Vienna for
confirmation. The tax levy took longer and was inevitably obstructed
by the self-interest of leading figures in Bohemia and Moravia, causing
Wallenstein to comment to Harrach that he would welcome some such
pretext for withdrawing his head from the noose and relinquishing his
command.^25