102 Wallenstein
deal with, but following the arrival of Danish and Swedish forces he
headed for Stralsund himself, hoping by means of an even larger show
of force coupled with an offer of clemency to achieve a settlement with
the city. When no positive response was forthcoming on his arrival
in early July he had little choice but to make good his threat of a full-
scale attack, particularly as he had a considerable army tied down by
this relatively insignificant city. Stralsund, however, was extremely
well defended, being almost an island and even on the landward
side protected by large stretches of water which hindered an assault.
Bombardment and fighting continued for two full days and nights,
with heavy casualties on both sides, leaving the Imperialists in posses-
sion of most of the defences but not yet inside the city. Another day
would probably have finished it, but the council asked for talks and
Wallenstein agreed, stopping the attacks although maintaining pres-
sure with artillery fire, despite which the city’s negotiators went back
and forth to consult, dragging out the discussions over an extended
period. Their prevarications were heavily influenced by the Danish and
Swedish commanders, and when the Danes used the opportunity to
bring in reinforcements Wallenstein realised that he was either going
to have to give up or to renew the assault, this time carrying it through
to the bitter end. He preferred to avoid that, so after making a face-
saving agreement whereby the duke of Pomerania accepted responsi-
bility for bringing his own city into line, he withdrew.
Many have questioned his motives for abandoning the siege, but
there seems little reason to doubt his own statement, made in a letter to
the emperor, that he wanted to avoid ‘the inevitable bloodbath’ which
arose when a city was taken by storm, particularly when the attacking
troops had themselves suffered heavy losses. As a soldier Wallenstein
was accustomed to doing what was necessary in accordance with the
standards of the times, but gratuitous bloodshed, terror tactics or repris-
als were not a part of his approach. He also added that such an outcome
would have been seen as ‘a great act of tyranny’, causing ‘massive
embitterment’, exactly what happened two years later when Tilly took
Magdeburg by storm in the most notorious event of the entire Thirty
Years War.^38 Storming Stralsund, itself a Hanseatic city, would also
have destroyed the good relations Wallenstein was trying to establish
with the Hanseatic League, while Christian’s fleet was offshore look-
ing for somewhere to land his army, so that the city was becoming an
increasingly unwelcome diversion from the main threat. The intention
throughout had been to oblige Stralsund to submit, not to destroy it,