At the Parting of the Ways 115assistance that they had given him against the Bohemian rebels.
Ferdinand agreed, and in the late summer a large Imperial army moved
into Italy, led first by Collalto and later by his deputies, Count Matthias
Gallas and Aldringer, but it was not until July 1630 that they finally
took Mantua and expelled Nevers from his duchy. Less than a year later
he got it back – or what was left of it after the armies had fought and
looted across it – as with Spain and the Empire under pressure from
events elsewhere peace had to be made in Italy.
Wallenstein had been against the war from the outset, both in prin-
ciple and on strategic grounds. As early as March 1628 the bishop of
Mantua, sent by Nevers on a diplomatic mission to the Imperial court,
reported back what he had heard from no less a person than the emper-
or’s chancellor, Count Verda Werdenberg; Wallenstein had told the
council and the Spanish ambassador that ‘if they wanted to wage a war
against Mantua and the duke of Nevers they should not let the thought
enter their heads that they would get a single soldier from him, even
if the emperor himself gave the order. It would be an unjust war, as all
the laws of the world supported Nevers.’ Wallenstein benefited from
lands taken from others, both in Mecklenburg and Bohemia, but the
dispossessed were undeniably rebels however dubious and vindictive
the emperor’s proceedings may have been. Nevers was not a rebel, and
the legal grounds invoked for action against him provided scarcely a
fig-leaf to cover the expropriation of his property for nakedly political
reasons. Wallenstein also feared – quite correctly – that a Spanish attack
would bring a French response, and that Imperial support for Spain
would renew French hostility to the Empire, adding a threat in the
south and west at a time when there were threats enough in the north
and east. As the situation developed he found a series of reasons for
delaying sending troops to Italy, at some times citing the need for men
in other theatres of war, at others referring to the possibility of a war
against the Turks, and at yet others claiming to be preparing to lead an
army to Italy in person. Throughout he advised against the campaign,
but he could not evade Imperial orders indefinitely. When troops were
eventually despatched he wrote to Ferdinand begging him to ensure
that the artillery and supplies promised by the Spanish were forthcom-
ing, as otherwise ‘the army will quickly be ruined, as a result of which
Your Majesty would lose more than you have won in all these wars, and
the damage would be irreparable’.^20
Although Wallenstein retained overall command of the Italian cam-
paign he limited himself to the strategic disposition of forces, remain-
ing in Germany and focusing his main attention on the problems in