116 Wallenstein
the north, while delegating operational control in Italy to Collalto and
his deputies. His view of the situation remained gloomy, as ‘all the
enemies of the House of Austria have made peace among themselves
and united to defend Nevers.’ He blamed Spain: ‘If the Spanish had
not attacked Nevers then France would not have become involved, and
nor would the Venetians’, adding that in addition to hostility from
Protestants because of the Edict of Restitution the war in Italy was turning
even Catholics against the Habsburg side. In February 1630 he pleaded
that ‘if it can actually be composed let no-one refrain from doing so, as
both Majesties [the emperor and the king of Spain] would gain far more
by turning the armies against the Dutch’. In April he declared that he
could not send any more men to Italy and told Collalto that he should
try to recruit locally there instead: ‘I cannot undertake any more recruit-
ment in the Empire, as I get reprimands from the court by the hour
on that account, while all the electors and princes are opposed to it.
The most important thing is that peace is made in Italy.’^21
The Mantuan war also diverted resources from the Netherlands,
as Wallenstein pointed out. Here his attitude fluctuated, sometimes
favouring attempts to negotiate a new truce and at others looking to
increase military support to enable Spain to keep the Dutch on the
defensive, hence limiting their ability to provide assistance to other ene-
mies of the Empire. Both were attempted. Once Christian of Denmark
was in full retreat Wallenstein transferred a number of regiments to the
Netherlands, while soon afterwards Spain began to explore the idea of a
truce. Had they achieved a quick success at Casale this might have been
more feasible, but as the siege dragged on the Dutch realised that their
best opportunities lay in the field rather than at the negotiating table.
Also in 1628, the Dutch navy captured the entire Spanish treasure fleet
bringing silver from America, both depriving Spain of the vital bullion
and making it available to finance Dutch military advances in 1629.
Early in that year they besieged the major city of Hertogenbosch in the
Spanish Netherlands, and although in response Spanish and Imperialist
forces invaded United Provinces territory the Dutch had the best of the
campaign. The Habsburg armies were forced to retreat, and the Dutch
not only took Hertogenbosch but also moved into north-west Germany,
where over the winter of 1629–30 they drove Spanish garrisons out of
many key places.
Wallenstein’s own priority in this period continued to be the threat
of Swedish intervention. This was a danger about which he had repeat-
edly warned, but which had not so far materialised other than on
the margin at Stralsund, perhaps one reason why it was dangerously