At the Parting of the Ways 119
army units has to anticipate or respond to the threats or opportunities
presented by the tactics of the opposing forces. Any general who fails to
do this adequately not only hazards the lives of his own men but also
risks the security of the ruler or state he serves. To the ordinary people,
however, and even to many of their princes, who had little informa-
tion concerning the wider military situation and even less knowledge
of strategy and logistics, the movements of the troops were inscrutable
but their presence was always unwelcome. Even the better-disciplined
units caused damage and consumed all the food, drink and fodder they
could lay hands on, so that the passage of a regiment was frequently
likened to that of a swarm of locusts. And the longer they stayed in one
place the worse it became.
At the time Germany was divided into a large number of individual
territories, ranging from the major to the very minor, and at any given
moment most were desperately seeking to avoid involvement in the
war. Military necessity and geography often combined to prevent the
generals from respecting the supposed neutrality of any but the most
substantial principalities, and not always even them, but those affected
were inclined to suspect political or financial motives, or to ascribe troop
visitations to the punitive intent or simple ill-will of the commander.
Sometimes there was an element of truth in this, as there may have
been more than one route a march could take or more than one place in
which a unit could be based, allowing other circumstances to influence
the choice, but more usually strategic considerations, supplies and prac-
ticality were the decisive factors. Of necessity protests and pleas com-
monly fell on deaf ears, but again the commanders, and the supreme
commander in particular, were held to blame.
If the passage of troops was unwelcome, billeting them was doubly
so, and providing winter quarters was worst of all. This was a relatively
recent innovation other than on a small scale, as until around the turn
of the seventeenth century it had been normal practice to disband
armies at the end of the campaigning season and to re-recruit if neces-
sary in the spring. Winter quartering meant the presence of large num-
bers of soldiers, their families and other dependents in billets for three
months or more, and sometimes significantly longer. Although these
unwelcome and usually non-paying guests were as widely dispersed
as possible, thus spreading the burden for the local population, the
economic effect on the territory as a whole was severe. Inevitably the
choice of location for winter quarters became highly political. The ideal
solution from a general’s point of view was to pass the season in enemy
country, but in practice this was only occasionally achievable. Where