The Wheel Is Come Full Circle 133dismissal or how relatively easily Ferdinand had been persuaded to let
him go.^20 There are more rational explanations for his behaviour than
mere vindictiveness.
Firstly we need not doubt that Wallenstein was tired and ill, disil-
lusioned and dispirited. En route from Memmingen to Bohemia he had
been forced to extend the journey by several weeks due to severe attacks
of gout, and these continued to trouble him in the following year. It is
hardly surprising that he was in no mood for a recall which would have
involved not merely starting again where he had left off, but having to
rebuild the army and to confront a military situation which had rapidly
deteriorated once he was off the scene. Furthermore the political situa-
tion did not change as rapidly as the military one, and while Ferdinand
would soon have been glad of his return the Catholic electors, as yet
unaffected by the war, remained as hostile as before. Nor had the finan-
cial position improved.^21 Wallenstein’s own resources were stretched
almost to breaking point, the emperor was as penniless as ever, and with
de Witte bankrupt and gone there were scant prospects of large-scale
borrowing from financiers, while after Regensburg the collection of suf-
ficient contributions would be even more difficult than before.
Secondly Wallenstein may initially have felt that his own return
would not be necessary in order to contain the Swedish threat. Gustavus
was a formidable general but he had suffered his defeats, whereas Tilly
had never lost a battle in a lifetime of campaigning. He also still had
a large and battle-hardened army, with the Catholic League core sup-
plemented by units returning from Italy, whereas although the Swedes
had increasing numbers, including a leavening of seasoned troops,
many of their regiments were newly formed and far from fully prepared
for a major contest of arms. Gustavus himself recognised this and he
proceeded cautiously, but instead of pressing him in the spring of 1631
Tilly instead committed much of his army to a protracted siege of
Magdeburg. This had been the first and indeed the only major territory
to declare for Gustavus after his landing, and Tilly’s intention was to
draw the Swedes deeper into Germany in an attempt to rescue the city
before forcing them into battle. The Swedish king was not to be drawn,
although he deferred his expected advance into Silesia to avoid appear-
ing to abandon his co-religionist allies. Magdeburg was taken by storm
on 20 May 1631, and in the sack and the terrible fire which followed the
majority of the citizens and a considerable number of Tilly’s men died.
Even then Tilly did not move against Gustavus, apart from one short
thrust which he had to abandon when the Swedes dug themselves
into an impregnable position at Werben, on the River Elbe. Instead he